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The purpose of this article is to provide an analysis of smart grids in the European Union (EU) as a way 
forward to reach sustainable energy. It does so by assessing the energy security, regulatory, and social 
and ethical aspects of smart grids in the EU. The article represents a significant milestone in the 
upscaling of the various aspects of smart grid technology across the EU. It deals with smart grid 
deployment and their impact on energy security with a view to a stronger role of prosumers in the 
energy market. It also analyses smart grid regulation. Specifically, it examines the existing legal 
frameworks that impact smart grids in the EU. It outlines existing EU Directives and assesses the level 
of implementation of these Directives in various EU Member States. This article also assesses the 
extent to which the existing legal frameworks facilitate the development of smart grids and proposes 
areas of further regulatory consideration. The article then explores the social and ethical dimension 
of smart grids in the context of the collaborative economy, the circular economy, and digital 
technology, including cybersecurity and data-management issues. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The 20th century was characterized by a top-down approach to the governance of climate change 
mitigation and energy. The 21st century, however, offers a bottom-up approach.1 One of the mega-
trends of the 21st century is the shift to this bottom-up approach in the democratic2 implementation 
of climate change mitigation plans3—a creation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change,4 which 
has become the locomotive of climate action. The same is true in energy governance, where we are 
witnessing an energy democratization in the decentralization of energy security governance and 
creation of new actors such as prosumers.5 This article aims to explain why we are witnessing a 
paradigm shift in the governance of international economic law, broadly defined, and how citizens can 
play a greater role to make this transition more solid.6 In other words, we seek to explain the shift 
from the core (i.e., centralized approaches to governance) to the crowd (i.e., decentralized, self-
organizing approaches to governance).7 
                                                            
1 See generally Leal-Arcas, R. “Sustainability, common concern and public goods,” The George Washington International Law 
Review, Vol. 49, Issue 4, 2017. 
2 The term ‘democratic’ is used in the true sense of the term, namely that power remains with the people. 
3 Several factors exacerbate climate change. For instance, increasingly, the world is experiencing frequent cases 
of floods and they are predicted to increase exponentially. One cause is global warming. Warmer seas evaporate 
faster and warmer air can retain more water vapour, which provokes the violence of storms and the intensity of 
heavy rains. See The Economist, “How to cope with floods,” p.11, 2 September 2017. Also, eating meat from 
animals has negative effects on climate change. See The Economist, “Feed as well as food,” pp. 13-14, at 13, 2 
September 2017.    
4 The Paris Agreement on Climate Change is one of four major legal instruments used to mitigate climate change. 
The other three are the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol and the 
Copenhagen Accord. The UNFCCC distinguishes itself because its objective (Article 2) is qualitative, not 
quantitative (namely it does not provide any guidance about temperature reduction in numerical terms). 
Another feature that makes the UNFCCC a prominent legal document of climate change mitigation is the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (Article 3.1). They Kyoto Protocol imposes legally binding 
obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to specific countries (so-called Annex I countries). Unlike the 
Kyoto Protocol, the Copenhagen Accord is not legally binding, which means that it is a political agreement to 
mitigate climate change. Moreover, unlike the UNFCCC, the Copenhagen Accord provides a quantitative 
objective, namely ‘to hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius’ (paragraph 2). The Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change is more flexible than the UNFCCC in that it does not create categories of countries, 
but instead offers nationally determined contributions to mitigate climate change. 
5 R. Leal-Arcas and Proedrou, F., “Prosumers: New actors in EU energy security,” Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 
Vol. 48, forthcoming 2017. 
6 See for instance the development at the sub-national level in the US, where cities and states, via their mayors and 
governors, are determined to implement the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, despite the decision of the federal 
government to withdraw from it. See Lumb, D. “61 US cities and three states vow to uphold Paris climate agreement,” 
Engadget, June 1, 2017, available at https://www.engadget.com/2017/06/01/61-us-cities-and-three-states-vow-to-uphold-
paris-climate-agreem/. See also an open letter to the international community and parties to the Paris Agreement from US 
state, local and business leaders by a bottom-up American network called ‘We Are Still In,’ at http://wearestillin.com/. 
Similarly, see the role of the United States Alliance at https://www.usclimatealliance.org/ or America’s Pledge at 
https://www.bloomberg.org/program/environment/americas-pledge/, both platforms committed to fight climate change. 
Other ways in which citizens can have a greater involvement in the energy-transition phenomenon is in solar energy, where 
people could install solar panels on the roof of their houses. This option would solve the delicate debate over where to place 
wind farms as part of the energy-transition phenomenon. 
7 For a similar approach to explain how work happens, see McAfee, A. and Brynjolfsson, E. Machine, Platform, Crowd: 
Harnessing our Digital Future, W.W. Norton, 2017. 
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Sustainable energy is a burning issue in a world where 1.2 billion people still have no access to 
electricity.8 One solution for sustainable energy is better governance of energy trade.9 Energy security, 
or access to energy at an affordable price, is one of the main problems humanity faces.10 Without 
access to energy, people and countries cannot develop their potential. Today’s environmental 
challenges are driving a shift from fossil fuels towards clean and renewable energy, i.e., energy from 
sustainable sources, as opposed to conventional sources such as oil, natural gas, or coal.11 These three 
necessities — energy that is affordable, secure, and clean — can be encompassed by the term 
“sustainable energy.” This transition away from fossil fuels will, however, come at a cost.12 Others 
argue that the goal of sustainable energy should be “to curb global warming, not to achieve 100% 
renewable energy.”13 One way to enhance energy security could be through greater energy efficiency, 
which may prove more effective than the deployment of renewable energy when it comes to reducing 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.14 Trade provides another way: north-eastern Germany is not very 
industrialized and therefore does not consume much energy, which is needed in south Germany and 
other more industrialized parts of the country. Here is where trading energy can help enhance energy 
security. 
The purpose of this article is to provide an analysis of smart grids in the European Union (EU) as a way 
forward to reach sustainable energy. It does so by assessing the energy security, regulatory, and social 
and ethical aspects of smart grids in the EU. We ask the question whether the level of deployment of 
smart grids, the degree of their current regulation, and their social and ethical dimension are adequate 
to make the transition to a low-carbon economy happen. We argue that there is still a long way to go 
before we reach a desirable outcome. This article represents a significant milestone in the upscaling 
of the various aspects of smart grid technology across the EU and pushes the frontiers of its existing 
regulatory regimes. Thus, a detailed evaluation of regional and local15 regulatory frameworks is 
provided to ensure the successful realization of smart grid deployment in various EU jurisdictions. 
This article discusses, among other issues, the role of electric vehicles (EVs) in decarbonizing the 
transport sector. Research shows that, if all new cars were electric, they would make up 90% of the 
world’s two billion cars by 2040, thereby saving 11 billion barrels of oil every year (or almost half of 
annual global production) and 4.7 billion tons of CO2 (this figure excludes emissions and oil used to 
make electric cars).16 This plausible reality raises questions such as: how can consumers influence the 
vehicle industry to make them go electric?17 How can mobility become renewable?  
Some European governments seem to be moving firmly in the direction of EVs: in July 2017, the United 
Kingdom (UK) government announced that it would ban the sale of new cars that run solely on petrol 
                                                            
8 See International Energy Agency, “Energy access database,” available at 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energydevelopment/energyaccessdatabase/. 
9 Leal-Arcas, R. et al., Energy Security, Trade and the EU: Regional and International Perspectives, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2016. 
10 Leal-Arcas, R. The European Energy Union: The quest for secure, affordable and sustainable energy, Claeys & Casteels, 
2016. 
11 Massai, L. European Climate and Clean Energy Law and Policy, Routledge, 2011. 
12 “100% renewable energy: At what cost?” The Economist, 15th July 2017, pp. 58-59. 
13 “Renewable-energy targets: A green red herring,” The Economist, 15th July 2017, p. 10. 
14 Idem. 
15 For an analysis of how transformation can happen locally, see R. Hopkins, The Power of Just Doing Stuff: How 
local action can change the world, 2013. 
16 See The Economist, “A flash in the sky,” Annual Supplement: The World if, 15th July 2017, pp. 16-17. 
17 All of this said, in the case of cars, their sales are falling because better cars and roads mean longer car life, which means 
fewer new-car sales, and it is a headwind for electric vehicles. See Kyle Stock, “The Real Reason Car Sales Are Falling,” 
Bloomberg, 2 August 2017, available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-02/the-real-reason-car-sales-
are-falling. 
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or diesel by 2040.18 The French government spoke in similar terms in its own announcement.19 
Carmakers are heading in the same direction: Volvo announced in 2017 that all Volvo cars will be 
electric or hybrid as of 2019.20 BMW, Porsche, and Audi have electric models that will enter the market 
by 2020.21 Outside of Europe, although no timeline has been suggested, China’s government would 
like to move towards a ban on gas vehicles, which will have profound implications for global 
carmakers, given China’s market size.22 This Chinese move is quite promising as China has some of the 
world’s biggest battery producers and is very active in electronics manufacturing.23  
Morgan Stanley, an investment bank, expects that, of the one billion cars on the road, half will be 
powered by battery by 2050, since the price of batteries is decreasing.24 Moreover, when it comes to 
GHG emissions, aviation and shipping are two key players in the transportation sector—they are 
responsible for GHG emissions equivalent to those of some countries that are major GHG emitters.25 
For the mitigation of climate change, electric or hybrid engines in aviation and shipping would be very 
effective. For instance, hybrid planes, with a capacity of 100 passengers, could take off and land using 
jet engines, but during the cruise, they could make use of electrically powered engines.26 Similarly, 
lighter electric engines for aviation have been developed. 
This article is divided into five sections. After this short introduction, Section 2 deals with smart grid 
deployment and its impact on energy security. Section 3 analyses smart grid regulation. It examines 
the existing legal frameworks that impact smart grids in the EU. It outlines existing EU Directives and 
assesses the level of implementation of these Directives in various EU Member States. It also assesses 
the extent to which existing legal frameworks facilitate the development of smart grids and proposes 
areas of further regulatory consideration. Section 4 concerns the social and ethical dimension of smart 
grids, including data-management issues. Section 5 provides the conclusion of this article. 
                                                            
18 The Economist, “Business,” 29th July 2017, p. 8. 
19 Idem. 
20 A. Vaughan, “All Volvo cars to be electric or hybrid from 2019,” The Guardian, 5 July 2017, available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jul/05/volvo-cars-electric-hybrid-2019. 
21 The Economist, “Cleaning up cars,” 30 September 2017, p. 31. 
22 The Economist, “Electric cars in China: Zooming ahead,” 16 September 2017, p. 68. 
23 Ibid. 
24 The Economist, “Charge of the battery brigade,” 9 September 2017, pp. 63-64. However, battery production 
is not emissions free. 
25 Leal-Arcas, R. Climate Change and International Trade, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013, Chapters 3 and 6. 
26 The Economist, “Let’s twist again,” 16 September 2017, pp. 81-82, at 82. 
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2 SMART GRID DEPLOYMENT AND THE IMPACT ON ENERGY SECURITY  
 
2.1. SETTING THE SCENE  
2.1.1. The geopolitical context 
The global energy market is still monopolized to a great extent by the production, trade, and 
consumption of oil and gas.27 The EU is no exception to this rule, with a high import ratio of both oil 
and gas. Unreliable oil producers, geopolitical instability in many oil-rich countries, economic and 
resource nationalism,28 transportation-related hazards, and the high volatility of international oil 
prices are constraining importers to face significant risks.29  
In the gas sector, the EU is confronting a practically oligopolistic external market with Russia, Algeria, 
and Norway supplying most of the imported gas.30 Azerbaijan and more distant Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG) suppliers also contribute to the EU’s import portfolio, without changing the EU’s dependence 
on a few exporters.31 Relations with the most important gas supplier, Russia, have become overtly 
problematic. This state of play must be borne in mind insofar as politics and international relations 
have a crucial influence on energy policies and international trade relations. 
Diversification of sources, routes, and suppliers has been high on the EU’s agenda. The Southern Gas 
Corridor32 and a few LNG initiatives are the only tangible steps towards this direction. Nevertheless, 
these efforts have not produced sea changes in Russia’s pivotal market role.33 The rationale of 
liberalization and competition is in accordance with the logic of diversification. This is so as both 
premises aim to create a level playing field for external actors in a market well-shielded from 
monopolistic structures and practices.34 While the application of the Third Energy Package35 has 
blocked some of Russia’s future investment moves, it cannot by itself substantially alter the EU’s 
import portfolio.36  
                                                            
27 The International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook,” OECD/IEA, Paris, p. 5, 2016, available at 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WorldEnergyOutlook2016ExecutiveSummaryEnglish.pdf. 
28 Economic nationalism is a threat to global sustainable development. 
29 D. Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011. 
30 Eurostat, “Main origin of primary energy imports, EU-28, 2005-2015 (% of extra EU-28 imports),” Eurostat, [Online]. 
Available: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Main_origin_of_primary_energy_imports,_EU-
28,_2005-2015_%28%25_of_extra_EU-28_imports%29_YB17.png. [Accessed 25 July 2017]. 
31 F. Proedrou, EU Energy Security in the Gas Sector: Evolving Dynamics, Policy Dilemmas and Prospects, Farnham: Ashgate, 
2012. 
32 The Southern Gas Corridor is a term used to describe planned infrastructure projects aimed at improving EU energy 
security by bringing natural gas from the Caspian region to Europe. See Trans Adriatic Pipeline, “Southern Gas Corridor,” 
Trans Adriatic Pipeline, 2017. [Online]. Available: https://www.tap-ag.com/the-pipeline/the-big-picture/southern-gas-
corridor. [Accessed 25 July 2017]. The Southern Gas Corridor is also known as the Fourth Corridor (the other three corridors 
running from North Africa, Norway and Russia). See R. Leal-Arcas et al., “The European Union and its Energy Security 
Challenges,” The Journal of World Energy Law and Business, vol. 8, p. 19, 2015. 
33 M. Sidi, “The scramble for energy supplies to South Eastern Europe: the EU's Southern Gas Corridor, Russia's pipelines and 
Turkey's role,” in Turkey as an Energy Hub? , Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2017, pp. 51-66. 
34 F. Proedrou, “EU Energy Security beyond Ukraine: Towards Holistic Diversification,” European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 
21, no. 1, pp. 57-73, 2016. 
35 The EU's Third Energy Package is a legislative package for an internal gas and electricity market with the purpose of further 
opening up these markets in the European Union. It consists of two directives and three regulations: Directive 2009/72/EC, 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity; Directive 2009/73/EC, concerning common rules for the 
internal market in natural gas; Regulation (EC) No 714/2009, on conditions for access to the network for cross-border 
exchanges in electricity; Regulation (EC) No 715/2009, on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks; 
and Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators. 
36 A. Goldthau &. N. Sitter, “Soft Power with a hard edge: EU policy tools and energy security,” Review of International Political 
Economy, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 941-965, 2015; A. Goldthau, “Assessing Nord Stream 2: regulation, geopolitics & energy security 
in the EU, Central Eastern Europe & the UK,” European Centre for Energy and Resource Security, London, 2016. 
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This is mainly due to the fact that Member States and their energy companies are responsible for 
negotiating and signing supply contracts. Indeed, Gazprom traditionally retains strategic alliances with 
several European oil and gas companies37 (such as Italy’s ENI, Austria’s OMV, France’s Gaz de France, 
and Germany’s EON Ruhrgas and Wintershall).38 Indeed, Russo-German relations have been 
remarkably cordial over the last decades, with energy cooperation being at the center of this 
partnership. Interestingly, the recent fallout between Russia and Ukraine, and Russia’s actions 
(invasion of Crimea and hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine) that evidently go against fundamental 
international law principles enshrined in several international treaties, have not resulted in any 
interruption of Russia-EU gas trade.39    
Having said this, several actors within the EU (particularly the European Commission, the European 
Parliament, and the Member States located in Central and Eastern Europe) are striving to counter 
Russia’s leverage in the EU energy market.40 While liberalization and diversification can be considered 
significant roadblocks but not game-changers, the need remains for holistic, innovative energy policies 
that will curtail the EU’s import dependence and ensuing energy insecurity.41 
 
2.1.2. The institutional context  
The key issue to be considered is how, by whom, and in what ways energy is governed at the EU level. 
Energy governance can be defined as multi-level management and regulation of energy supply, calling 
for variable degrees of coordination and cooperation between several actors.42 In the words of Florini 
and Sovacool, energy governance refers to “collective action efforts undertaken to manage and 
distribute energy resources and provide energy services,” and can hence serve as “a meaningful and 
useful framework for assessing energy-related challenges.”43 As a result, international cooperation is 
crucial for tackling collective-action problems. 
Regarding EU energy governance, a definite dualism is at play. On the one hand, Member States 
implement energy policies at the national level. On the other, the European Commission sets the 
energy blueprint at the EU level. In particular, Member States retain their sovereignty in the energy 
sector on the grounds that energy is a strategic good. Consequently, decisions on the domestic energy 
mix should lie solely with national authorities.44 Since the Lisbon Treaty, energy has come under the 
shared competences of the EU and the Member States.45 National energy measures must be designed 
in conformity with EU policies. Examples of such strategies include the 2020 climate and energy 
                                                            
37 It is interesting to note that, as of 2013, 90 companies caused two-thirds of anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
emissions. See Goldenberg, S. “Just 90 companies cause two-thirds of man-made global warming emissions,” 
The Guardian, 20 November 2013, available at https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/20/90-
companies-man-made-global-warming-emissions-climate-change. 
38 A. Aissaoui et al., Gas to Europe: The Strategies of Four Major Suppliers, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
39 T. Casier, “Great Game or Great Confusion: The Geopolitical Understanding of EU-Russia Energy Relations,” Geopolitcs, 
vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 763-778, 2016.  
40 A. Goldthau &. N. Sitter, “Soft Power with a hard edge: EU policy tools and energy security,” Review of International Political 
Economy, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 941-965, 2015; A. Goldthau, “Assessing Nord Stream 2: regulation, geopolitics & energy security 
in the EU, Central Eastern Europe & the UK,” European Centre for Energy and Resource Security, London, 2016. 
41 F. Proedrou, “EU Energy Security beyond Ukraine: Towards Holistic Diversification,” European Foreign Affairs Revew, vol. 
21, no. 1, pp. 57-73, 2016. 
42 See generally Leal-Arcas, R. et al., International Energy Governance: Selected Legal Issues, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014. 
43 A. Florini and B. K. Sovacool, “Who governs energy? The challenges facing global energy governance,” Energy Policy, vol. 
37, no. 12, pp. 5239-5248, 2009. 
44 T. Maltby, “European Union energy policy integration: A case of European Commission policy entrepreneurship and 
increasing supranationalism,” Energy Policy, vol. 55, pp. 435-444, 2013.  
45 Energy, in its wide sense, is expressly referred to as a matter of shared competence between the EU and its Member States. 
See Article 4 TFEU. 
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package46 and the 2030 climate and energy framework.47 The Commission has thus pioneered an 
ambitious climate-change mitigation agenda that is bound to impact the Union’s energy policy.48  
EU energy policy is driven both by Member State governments and supranational institutions. It is 
within this institutional framework that the European Commission is currently fostering research on 
ground-breaking technologies, the elaboration of forward-looking regulation, the transformation of 
the traditional energy market towards low-carbon systems, and the establishment of prosumer 
markets.49 Such schemes are deeply rooted in the EU’s vision to revitalize its energy security.  
2.2. SMART GRIDS: A MULTIVALENT INSTRUMENT50  
Smart grids, together with the promotion and integration of renewable energy generation in the 
electricity network, bear significant potential for achieving low-carbon energy security, protection 
from the vagaries of international energy markets, affordable energy costs, enhanced access to 
energy, existent and future climate goals, empowerment of citizens, and enhanced competitiveness 
for the European economy.51  
As the International Energy Agency (IEA) underlines, the sweeping renewable energy generation 
revolution has propelled a profound debate over the design of the evolving power market and 
electricity security.52 What makes the ongoing energy transition different to previous ones is the 
parallel change in both the energy and digital technology sectors. The contemporary energy transition 
is characterized by common changes in integrated systems.53 As such, the scope and scale of this 
transformation is ubiquitously potent and unprecedented.  
This transition basically concerns the electricity sector. This industry expands exponentially at the cost 
of other sectors, and is projected to account for an increasing percentage of energy consumption 
growth, from 25% in the last 25 years to nearly 40% by 2040.54 The electricity industry fosters crucial 
spill-overs to other sectors as well. The transportation sector, with the use of EVs as an inherent part 
of the grid, is an indicative example. Verbong, Beemsterboer, and Sengers highlight the differences 
between the old and the emerging energy system as follows: “[it] will be more hybrid, in terms of the 
location and type of generation; lower carbon because of a larger contribution of renewable energy 
sources (RES); more complex and vulnerable; and less hierarchical.”55  
These changes are bound to profoundly impact society at large and energy users in particular.56 
Indeed, smart grids can serve a multitude of goals, such as spearheading economically optimal 
performance; fostering energy market competition; managing energy consumption and efficiency; 
                                                            
46 European Commission, “2020 climate and energy package,” European Commission, 26 July 2017. [Online]. Available: 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2020_en. [Accessed 26 July 2017]. 
47 Conclusions of the European Council of 23 October 2014, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/145397.pdf. 
48 T. Maltby, “European Union energy policy integration: A case of European Commission policy entrepreneurship and 
increasing supranationalism,” Energy Policy, vol. 55, pp. 435-444, 2013.  
49 European Commission, “Clean Energy for All Europeans – unlocking Europe's growth potential,” European Commission, 
30 November 2016. [Online]. Available: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4009_en.htm. [Accessed 5 September 
2017]. 
50 This section draws from F. Proedrou, “Are smart grids the key to EU energy security?,” in R. Leal-Arcas and J. Wouters, 
(eds.), Research Handbook on EU Energy Law and Policy, Edward Elgar, 2017. 
51 European Commission, “Smart grids and meters,” European Commission, 7 September 2017. [Online]. Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-consumers/smart-grids-and-meters. [Accessed 7 September 2017]. 
52 The International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook,” OECD/IEA, Paris, 2016, p. 1, available at 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WorldEnergyOutlook2016ExecutiveSummaryEnglish.pdf 
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International Energy Agency, Paris, 2017. 
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55 G. P. Verbong, S. Beemsterboer and F. Sengers, “Smart grids or smart users?: involving users in developing a low carbon 
electricity economy,” Energy Policy, vol. 52, pp. 117-125, 2013. 
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achieving maximum possible carbon emissions reductions; maximizing network efficiency; fomenting 
system and technology safety, security, and resilience; altering and cleaning the energy mix; creating 
storage capacity and new technologies in the storage sector; expanding to the transportation sector 
through electric, plug-in vehicles; democratizing the energy systems; and empowering 
citizens/customers. 
Smart grids are not only being deployed in the EU, but in several other countries as well, most 
prominently in China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States (US).57 It is important to stress that 
there are different drives for the roll-out of smart grids in each case. The frequent outages in the US 
electricity system, usually caused by ageing infrastructure, have motivated the substitution of the 
conventional grid with smart grids.58 China’s main preoccupation has been with air quality and 
pollution.59 Smart grids have been part of the answer to this environmental question.  
The EU is set to proceed with the large-scale roll-out of smart grids to fight climate change and improve 
energy efficiency in order to hit climate and energy goals set for the next several decades.60 In this 
context, smart grids are not per se climate policy instruments, but speak to a wider set of goals.61 As 
Eid, Hakvoort, and de Jong put it, the way power markets evolve depends on “the innovators’ and 
designers’ imagination producing market designs and outcomes better aligned with their political and 
value preferences.”62 
 
2.3. THE OPERATION OF PROSUMER MARKETS   
From the 1990s onwards, the EU electricity sector underwent a transition from vertically organized 
electricity companies that controlled production, transmission, distribution, and supply activities, to 
the unbundling of these services.63 Transmission System Operators (TSOs)64 were responsible only for 
                                                            
57 International Trade Administration, “Smart Grid Top Markets Report. Update, January 2017,” International Trade 
Administration, 2017. 
58 Scientific American, “Preventing Blackouts: Building a Smarter Power Grid,” Scientific American, 14 August 2017. [Online]. 
Available: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/preventing-blackouts-power-grid/. [Accessed 5 September 2017]. 
59 As a result, China has been very active in climate action in recent years and intends to do so in years to come. 
See, for instance, China’s ambition to spend over $360 bill on renewables by 2020, M. Forsythe, “China Aims to 
Spend $360 billion on renewable energy by 2020,” The New York Times, 5 January 2017, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/05/world/asia/china-renewable-energy-investment.html?mcubz=0; on 
wind energy, China’s investment has been remarkable: S. Evans, “Mapped: How China dominates the global 
wind energy market,” 19 April 2016, available at https://www.carbonbrief.org/mapped-how-china-dominates-
the-global-wind-energy-market; see also S. Lacey, “China adds more than 5GW of solar PV capacity in the first 
quarter of 2015,” 21 April 2015, available at https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/china-adds-more-
than-5gw-of-solar-pv-capacity-in-the-first-quarter-of-2015#gs.pgeEFKg; on solar energy, in 2017 China opened 
the world’s largest floating solar plant (https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/china-worlds-largest-
floating-solar-power/) and built a 250-acre solar farm shaped like a giant panda (www.sciencealert.com/china-
just-built-a-250-acre-solar-farm-shaped-like-a-giant-panda). 
60 C. Eid, R. Hakvoort and M. de Jong, Global trends in the political economy of smart grids: A tailored perspective on 'smart' 
for grids in transition, UNU-WIDER Working Paper 22/2016. 
61 Ibid. 
62 A. Bressand, “The Role of Markets and Investment in Global Energy,” in The Handbook of Global Energy Policy, A. Goldthau, 
Ed., West Sussex, John Wiley & Sons, 2013, pp. 15-29, p. 25. 
63 European Parliament, “Understanding electricity markets in the EU,” European Parliament, November 2016. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/593519/EPRS_BRI%282016%29593519_EN.pdf. 
[Accessed 5 September 2017]. 
64 A Transmission System Operator (TSO) can be defined as a natural or legal person responsible for operating, ensuring the 
maintenance of and, if necessary, developing the transmission system in a given area and, where applicable, its 
interconnections with other systems, and for ensuring the long-term ability of the system to meet reasonable demands for 
the transmission of electricity See Article 2 (4) Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 
2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC and Article 2 (4) 
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the balancing of the load and its transmission from large electricity production plants at high voltage 
levels. From there, Distribution System Operators (DSOs)65 distributed electricity to every corner. As 
we move to an electricity sector comprised of multiple large and small producers, Virtual Power Plants 
(VPPs), and decentralized energy production, the role, rationale for, and competences of the TSOs 
remain mired in uncertainty. DSOs, on the other hand, seem well-placed in the new energy setting. 
Indeed, according to the European Commission’s proposed internal electricity market directive, their 
role will be significantly enhanced, principally when it comes to coordinating and managing the energy 
produced by the new decentralized energy producers.66 DSOs are anticipated to absorb the energy 
thus produced, manage the load, and efficiently distribute electricity to households and corporate 
premises.67 The digitalization of services through advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) will 
massively facilitate their upgraded role.68 
This being the case, one could anticipate the TSOs’ reaction and their pledge for a place in the sun. 
This potential friction raises questions as to how the competences of the new actors are going to be 
divided in the new energy landscape.69  
Energy policy goals and correspondingly relevant national jurisdictions will play a pivotal role in 
moving the transition forward. Top-down, bottom-up, and hybrid (both top-down and bottom-up)70 
energy policy blueprints mandate variable leeway for different actors across the energy chain. Some 
aspects can be legally binding and perhaps commissioned to specific market players (e.g., smart meter 
roll-outs). Another energy policy goal would be allowing utilities, DSOs, and consumers to decide the 
ways, and pace at which, they move forward. For now, a hybrid model seems to be emerging. In this 
architecture, climate goals have been set at the higher governance level but the smart grid transition 
is carried out at the lower governance level. For example, environmental targets are set out by 
supranational instruments such as the 2020 Climate and Energy Package,71 whereas the deployment 
of smart meters is effectively carried out on a national basis. Thus, certain EU Member States such as 
Spain are already well on their way to hit a 100% smart meter roll-out.72 Conversely, other EU Member 
States such as the Czech Republic and Portugal have foregone replacing conventional meters with 
                                                            
Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal 
market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC. 
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2 (6) Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the 
internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC. 
66 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the internal market in 
electricity, at p. 68, COM(2016) 864 final/2 (23 February 2017). 
67 Ibid. 
68 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the internal market for 
electricity, at pp. 4-5, COM(2016) 861 final (30 November 2016).  
69 Ibid.   
70 A top-down approach to a problem is a situation that begins at the highest conceptual level and works down to the details. 
An example of such an approach would be where targets are set out at the international level and must be attained through 
national policies and measures. A bottom-up approach to a problem is one that begins with details and works up to the 
highest conceptual level. An example of such an approach would be where action starts at the national level based on each 
country´s circumstances through a patchwork of national policies and measures (which are not necessarily binding) until 
they develop into unified policies at the international plane. 
71 These environmental targets aim to 1) reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 20%; 2) reach 20% of renewable energy 
in the total energy consumption in the EU; and 3) increase energy efficiency to save 20% of EU energy consumption, all by 
2020. See European Commission, “2020 Climate and Energy Package,” European Commission, 9 September 2017. [Online]. 
Available: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2020_en. [Accessed 9 September 2017].  
72 Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia, “El 62% de los contadores analógicos ya han sido sustituidos por 
contadores inteligentes,” Nota de Prensa, 2017, p. 1. 
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smart metering systems due to economic reasons.73 Such stances are in accordance with the EU law 
principle of subsidiarity, according to which Member States are given the discretion to decide for 
themselves how they are going to reach the goals mutually agreed upon at the top EU political level.74  
The previous reform of the electricity markets carries its important heritage to today’s transition. 
Unbundling75 has taken place in different ways in the various Member States.76 In cases where legal 
unbundling took place, corporate links between the generation and distribution network companies, 
although they constitute two different legal entities, may well be maintained. This will create benefits 
to actors in the retail market. This is not the case in ownership unbundling, where the generation and 
network companies are fully separated. A level-playing field is indispensable if we are to avoid 
privileging certain actors vis-à-vis others.77  
The specific market conditions also impact the pace and scale of investments. For example, market 
players with dominant market shares naturally prioritize retaining their central position, rather than 
investing in new network infrastructure and smart grid roll-outs, as the benefits that will accrue are 
unlikely to match the costs of reduced revenues resulting from a lessened market share.78 On the 
other hand, investments are very pertinent not only in consideration of existing legislation, but also 
for tackling and anticipating market competition. In this context, DSOs are keen to invest in AMI.79 
Private investors can find a niche investing in control boxes downstream from the meter. A significant 
caveat is that private investment can render customers captive in light of the long contractual lead 
times that are imposed so that costs are recovered.80 This in itself obstructs competition. Such issues 
must be seriously considered when designating the new regulatory framework for smart grid 
deployment. Waiting games are also typical corporate tactics that should be anticipated and treated 
appropriately, since existing market power determines future over- or under-investment plans.81 
In this new energy landscape, opportunities are opening for new energy actors as well. One such type 
is energy aggregators. The rationale for their emergence is to provide flexibility and join the Balancing 
Responsible Parties (BRPs)82 in what will be a much more variable corporate electricity landscape. 
Such a role can also be taken up by incumbents. In the new market, however, flexibility services and 
packages will be crucial, and hence there seems to be much space for new corporate actors, services, 
and associated innovation. These services revolve around collecting decentralized prosumers’ savings 
and energy generation and selling it back to utilities and BRPs in the form of “flexibility packages.”83  
                                                            
73 Report from the Commission “Benchmarking smart metering deployment in the EU-27 with a focus on electricity”, at p. 4, 
COM(2014) 356 final (17 June 2014). 
74 C. Eid, R. Hakvoort and M. de Jong, Global trends in the political economy of smart grids: A tailored perspective on 'smart' 
for grids in transition, UNU-WIDER Working Paper 22/2016, p. 10. 
75 Ownership unbundling is the “process by which a large company with several different lines of business retains one or 
more core businesses and sells off the remaining assets, product/service lines, divisions or subsidiaries. Unbundling is done 
for a variety of reasons, but the goal is always to create a better performing company or companies.” See Investopedia, 
“Unbundling,” Investopedia, [Online]. Available: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/unbundling.asp. [Accessed 5 
September 2017]. 
76 European Parliament, “Understanding electricity markets in the EU,” European Parliament, November 2016. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/593519/EPRS_BRI%282016%29593519_EN.pdf. 
[Accessed 5 September 2017]. 
77 Ibid., p. 9. 
78 J. Donoso, “Self-consumption regulation in Europe,” Energetica International, no. 7, 2015, p. 37. 
79 EDSO, “European Distributed System Operator for Smart Grids,” EDSO, 2014. 
80 C. Clastres, “Smart grids: Another step towards competition, energy security and climate change objectives,” Energy Policy, 
vol. 39, no. 9, pp. 5399-5408, 2011. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Balance Responsible Party (BRP) can be defined as a market participant or its chosen representative responsible for its 
imbalances in the electricity market. See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the internal market for electricity, at p, 38 COM(2016) 861 final (30 November 2016). 
83 For further details on prosumers, see Leal-Arcas, R. and Proedrou, F. “Prosumers: New actors in EU energy security,” 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 48, 2017.  
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Yet, another type of actors to emerge may be small storage providers. These can store the energy they 
have produced (in batteries or EVs, for instance) and resell it for a high premium in a market in dire 
need of flexibility, back-up capacity, and last resort solutions. Such services can be developed at the 
community, district, or neighborhood level. In this case, the emergence of energy co-operatives may 
take shape. Integrated energy services companies are the key to the new electricity market.84  
At an even lower level, individuals, households, and energy cooperatives can become energy actors 
themselves. They can sell the energy they produce or conserve to utilities and/or aggregators. Both 
flexibility and network optimization are achieved in this way. Distributed energy resources and storage 
facilities are central to the energy transition.85  
Whether storage capacity will be incorporated successfully in smart grids will be critical to their 
eventual performance. Leaving aside the contested debate over the likelihood of success, storage 
capacity will tackle peak consumption, reduce system-wide generation costs, and minimize network 
congestions, thereby optimizing the operation of the electricity network.86 
EVs are a storage capacity option that is also highly contested.87 Charging infrastructure costs, 
logistics, and issues regarding charging time and efficiency both for the vehicle and for the grid must 
still be resolved. Nevertheless, EVs have the potential to decarbonize the transport sector. This would 
represent a huge leap forward in meeting the EU’s climate targets and contributing to climate change 
mitigation.88  
The development of prosumer markets is based on two pillars. The first regards hardware 
(infrastructure); the other concerns software (the associated legislation and regulation). In this vein, 
the European Commission made a handful of important steps forward. Firstly, it recognized 
consumers’ right to self-consumption. This will lead to all national jurisdictions gradually embracing 
self-consumption. Moreover, prosumers are explicitly encouraged to sell their energy surplus to other 
energy actors, adding in this way to the energy market’s resilience and becoming active stakeholders 
in the energy transition.89 Secondly, the European Commission explicitly referred to energy 
communities, granting the right to prosumers to group together and join the market.90 Finally, the 
European Commission strongly recommended advancing energy performance-related information as 
well as information regarding the sources of district heating and cooling systems. This will further 
empower prosumers and energy communities to improve their energy performance (including 
production consumption and trading). In addition, the quality of information that consumers obtain 
will come under the scrutiny of regulatory authorities. This also includes the refinement of the 
Guarantees of Origin system for energy resources.91  
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The advent of prosumer markets entails the commercialization, rationalization, and economization of 
consumer behavior. Through demand response, the European Commission expects prosumers to take 
full control of their energy usage. Prosumers will be able to adjust their patterns and be economical 
and efficient. The inflow of relevant information will allow them to adjust, conserve, and choose 
flexible contracts. Switching off unnecessary appliances or turning down the thermostat at peak hours 
not only provides monetary benefits, but also contributes to balancing the grid. Conversely, 
consumers are incentivized to use electricity when it is cheap (e.g., doing the laundry at late hours).92  
Smart applications can substantially enhance energy efficiency. Instructing the washing machine to 
wash the clothes at the lowest price of electricity during the day can lead to optimal results for both 
the consumer and the grid. Dynamic price contracts are also a useful tool for demand management. 
Based on their consumption patterns, consumers are encouraged to negotiate suitable contracts with 
electricity suppliers. From the side of utilities, well-targeted, flexible contracts should increasingly 
become part of their corporate strategy to cater to customers’ individualized needs. Competition 
forces can work well in this sector and lead to a wave of easily adjustable contracts.  
Moreover, a number of pricing mechanisms (e.g., real-time pricing, time-of-use pricing, critical-time 
pricing, and variable peak pricing) can also be put to good use. They not only reflect market 
fundamentals, they also render consumers more aware of price variations according to market 
dynamics.93 Thus, last resort solutions like load-shedding and self-rationing can be altogether 
abandoned. However, dynamic pricing contracts entail several difficulties. It is hard for utilities to 
create spot-on abstract models of “representative agents,” taking the heterogeneity in the energy use 
patterns of different consumers into account.94 Devising effective contracts is also challenging from 
the supply side, since different utilities face different costs in the energy they buy to respond to their 
customers’ needs. This is especially true when it comes to buying flexibility packages themselves. It is 
natural then to anticipate that they may remain averse to making even more sophisticated contracts.95  
An important aspect of the deployment of smart grids lies in revisiting the philosophy behind their 
functioning rather than borrowing the one underpinning the functioning of the conventional grid. The 
conventional grid has been premised on the worst-case dispatch philosophy.96 With the supply side 
being a priori known, utilities focused their efforts on balancing it every second with demand. The 
danger lay in an imbalance occurring either due to a supply disruption (e.g., an accident in a generation 
plant) or an unpredictable surge in electricity demand (e.g., a heat wave). To avert such mishaps, 
utilities retained large reserve capacity to ensure that electricity dispatch would still be possible when 
demand exceeded predictions or supply was decreased. Such a policy was neither sustainable nor 
cheap but at least hedged against the danger of power cuts and load-shedding.97 
These principles and rationale are unsuitable for smart grids. The dynamic nature of both supply and 
demand in the new electricity landscape calls for a new philosophy.98 The increase of intermittent 
solar and wind energy, the lack of storage capacity as of now, the development of micro-grids, the 
increased variability regarding consumer preferences, and the way consumers will operate smart 
appliances result in increased uncertainty in both supply and demand. Smart meters, sensors, and 
demand response mechanisms can mediate and manage the variability and unpredictability of power 
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markets by providing both mechanisms for controlling energy use and precise information on the state 
of the power system and the supply-demand equilibrium.99  
It is thus essential to redefine the risks in the operation of the power markets and their management. 
What is considered acceptable risk now must be adjusted to the new operating conditions of smart 
grids and power markets. The demand response of all consumers will need to be factored into a 
probabilistic demand curve, which will be analogous to the generation availability curve of 
intermittent renewable energy.100 The focus will continually be on the movements in the net load, the 
difference between aggregate demand (load) and variable generation. The capacity, ramp rate, 
duration, and lead time for increasing or decreasing supply will have to be factored into such analyses 
as well, to optimize the smart grids’ responses to the fluctuating supply-demand dynamics.101  
Finally, it is necessary to integrate cross-border markets and capacity into risk management analysis. 
The EU has managed to establish a functional cross-border power market through its day-ahead 
market with many national markets now coupled.102 This has been instrumental in fomenting price 
competition, providing further leverage for load balancing, optimizing back-up capacity, and 
increasing resilience.103 A handful of physical barriers such as congestion, lack of transmission 
capacity, and/or underutilization remain, leading to sub-optimal transmission returns and hub market 
differentials.104 These block, rather than enhance, cross-border trade. A further step regards the 
extension of such schemes into Energy Community members that are not EU members as well as to 
neighboring states outside the Energy Community. A more critical challenge regards the adjustment 
of the cross-border market to the new reality of “real-time” intra-day trade.105  
2.4. SMART GRIDS AND ENERGY SECURITY106  
The transition to low-carbon energy systems is the crucial political economy issue for the EU, as it 
stands in the nexus of energy, politics, and markets. With power markets developing into dynamic 
energy system integrators, smart grids emerge as the most suitable structures to help the EU achieve 
its three principal energy security goals (sustainability, security of supply, and affordability). Smart 
grids are power networks that utilize two-flow transmission of information to maximize the balancing 
capacity of the system and achieve optimal electricity transmission and services.107 In doing so, they 
provide resilience vis-à-vis supply-demand disequilibria and power outages. Moreover, they also 
create new markets and commodities.108 Smart grids therefore impact the electricity industry and 
carry the potential to “smarten” houses and all kinds of premises in terms of energy use and 
efficiency.109   
Smart grids integrate renewable sources at the upstream level, advance overall renewable generation, 
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including self-generation, enable energy efficiency and conservation, promise to achieve low-carbon 
energy security, and hedge against the volatility of international energy markets. On the other hand, 
the establishment of smart grids requires high upfront investment costs and the creation of 
operational markets to promote the understanding of smart grids and their benefits as well as an 
assortment of incentives for their optimal utilization. Demand response management is key in this 
process.  
For decades, EU energy policy has been preoccupied with a number of issues, including threats of 
supply cuts, diversification schemes, mitigation of dependence on external producers, fluctuating 
prices, and providing dynamic responses to a warming planet.110 The deliberations around the 
establishment of an Energy Union naturally focus on these aspects in an effort to effectively provide 
security of supply, integrate the energy market, enhance demand-side policies, ensure de-
carbonization of the economy, and further research and innovation.111  
Interestingly, the European Commission has been calling for a paradigm shift. This focuses on placing 
EU citizens at the heart of energy security by means of self-consumption, distributed generation, and 
the creation of prosumers’ markets and local energy communities.112 Such far-reaching developments 
could also bring about uncertainty in energy production and consumption. Hence, it is imperative to 
create mechanisms that will ensure the optimal balance of the electricity load at all times.    
 
2.4.1. Sustainability prospects   
2.4.1.1. Advantages  
Smart grids play a decisive role in the proliferation of indigenous renewable energy generation. 
Priority dispatch mechanisms ensure that RES enter the grid.113 High-efficiency photovoltaics 
installations bear the highest energy return factor as well as the largest life-cycle carbon emissions 
offsets, assuming that land availability is not an issue.114 Consequently, the integration of Information 
and Communications Technologies (ICT) systems into the network would only serve to augment the 
efficiency and benefits of RES. 
It is a well-known fact that development leads to increasing per capita energy consumption. The 
introduction of digital technology is promising since it will enable European consumers to be aware 
of, adjust, and optimize their energy consumption.115 Therefore, one can reasonably anticipate that 
energy consumption will be rationalized and reduced. Smart meters convey all the information 
regarding supply, demand, transmission, and real-time consumption so that prosumers can consume 
energy in an optimal manner.116 Additional AMI, such as in-home automation and in-home displays, 
will serve the same goals.117 The use of sensors by utilities so that voltage at the consumers’ end 
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remains low also results in optimized energy conservation.118  
Smart grids are a striking development in that they provide consumers with the possibility of 
generating energy themselves. This will lead to an exponential increase of overall renewable energy 
production. Together with the anticipated increase in energy savings and efficiency, this can translate 
into a significant reduction of oil and gas imports. Belgium features here as an excellent case in point. 
Enhanced incentives119 for the installation of solar panels have rendered private households producers 
of their own energy. This releases pressure from the grid and supplies renewable energy to it.120   
The architecture of smart grids allows the creation of local energy communities by means of 
distributed generation (micro-generation). In turn, distributed generation reduces the associated 
costs of investment in new traditional large power generation plants. Moreover, energy can also be 
consumed at the point of its production. This minimizes not only leakages but also logistical problems. 
Another effect of self-consumption and distributed generation is that they release pressure from the 
transmission grid and effectively prioritize the use of renewable energy.121 In this context, the 
European Commission has been encouraged to propose the escalation of the EU’s energy efficiency 
target for 2030 from 27% to 30%.122  
Increased production of renewable energy, self-consumption, and distributed generation can 
substantially clean the mix and dwindle imports of fossil fuels.123 A recent study has convincingly 
shown that:  
Utilizing existing infrastructure such as existing building roofs and shade structures does 
significantly reduce the embodied energy requirements (by 20–40%) and in turn the EPBT 
[energy pay-back time] of flat-plate PV systems due to the avoidance of energy-intensive 
balance of systems (BOS) components like foundations . . . [while] a greater life-cycle energy 
return and carbon offset per unit land area is yielded by locally-integrated non-concentrating 
systems, despite their lower efficiency per unit module area.124 
The increase of renewable energy generation and the need to continually balance the electricity load 
raise the issue of storage. EVs that can be plugged into the grid and serve as batteries hold high 
promise for extending the benefits of the electricity sector to transportation, a sector that accounts 
for a significant percentage of total EU carbon emissions.125   
 
2.4.1.2. Risks and challenges ahead  
Smart grids and their full-scale roll-out face important challenges. The further electrification of 
consumption systems with a view to promoting energy efficiency may lead to higher energy 
consumption. Indeed, requiring less energy for one function or service does not necessarily lead to 
lower overall energy usage. For instance, a “smart” household using an EV with a fast charging point 
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might find that, owing to the high voltage requirements of the EV’s fast-charger, its net consumption 
is still relatively high. This may be so despite having technology to help reduce its everyday 
consumption. Hence, energy efficiency as an end in and of itself is not enough to lower energy 
consumption. Additional policies and market support measures are required if this goal is to be 
achieved.126  
Furthermore, electricity markets and their regulation have failed to catch up with the pace of 
renewable energy production. It is surprising that Greece and Spain, two Mediterranean countries 
that enjoy substantial solar irradiance, have only recently established a regulatory framework for self-
consumption. Spain did so in 2015, while Greece did so previously, in 2014.127 Even if this constitutes 
a positive step, it hardly balances the priority given to larger solar and wind parks via financial 
mechanisms.128 Conversely, the regulation and policies in place fail to promote self-consumption. In 
Spain, small-scale investors must pay an obscure tax, dubbed “tax on the sun,” to be allowed to carry 
out these activities.129 On top of that, the most common type of self-consumer is not entitled to any 
remuneration should they wish to export their electricity surplus to the domestic grid.130 As a result, 
such self-consumers have no incentive to do so. Efforts to encourage a cleaner energy mix and lower 
emissions are hampered by such provisions.131 In other Member States, such as Belgium and Germany, 
self-consumers are charged for exporting electricity to the national grid.132 Such policies represent a 
substantial disincentive for promoting clean energy production.133 What is more, RES were not used 
due to the network’s failure to accommodate the energy produced.134 Micro-LNG grids135 have 
emerged as the first significant market response and challenge to renewable energy-run smart grids. 
Micro-LNG grids can surpass conventional smart grids because they feature the critical advantage of 
storage capacity.136  
For now, Member States maintain back-up capacity through capacity mechanisms, which allow coal 
and gas-fired plants to operate and provide energy when needed. These constitute a backdoor to the 
perpetuation of energy derived from fossil fuels throughout the energy transition.137 In particular, the 
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EU has legislated that all new generation plants launched from 2020 onwards as well as every 
generation plant after 2025 will have to comply with an emission performance standard of 550 grams 
per kilowatt hour to be included in the capacity mechanism.138 Modern gas plants meet this 
threshold.139 Coal-fired plants are also likely to meet it if they follow appropriate carbon abatement 
techniques.140 These numbers contrast sharply with the IEA’s projected carbon intensity of electricity 
generation, which brings performance standards to 335 grams in the baseline scenario and to only 80 
grams by 2040  in the most optimistic deep de-carbonization scenario (in comparison with 515 grams 
today).141 The more prices remain at reasonable levels, the more reliance on fossil fuel plants 
decreases. This entails a greener energy mix and the reduction of CO2 emissions.142 In this context, one 
should also anticipate the fossil industry’s resistance to the substitution of the capacity mechanism 
with a profusion of other schemes, such as clean energy storage capacity (including EVs and batteries), 
cross-border functional interconnections, and market-based real-time congestion management.143  
While the transition to clean energy has discouraged oil and gas imports, it has brought about an 
increase in coal use.144 Germany’s Energiewende145 is a good case in point.146 More generally, the 
electrification of the energy sector means that the sources feeding it become even more significant 
for climate change mitigation. In this context, electric heating makes sense if it is powered by sun and 
wind rather than coal. The same holds true for the transport sector. While petrol emissions are 
significant, emissions from coal-fired electric cars will be even more harmful to the environment.147 
This brings us to the fundamental importance of policy to prioritize clean energy and foster green 
smart grids. Two instruments that enhance renewable generation have come under criticism. The first 
is the RES-E (Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources) scheme that subsidizes renewable energy 
generation in the form of either feed-in tariffs or premiums.148 The second is the RES dispatch priority 
mechanism.149 The main argument underpinning their censure is that these schemes unwittingly favor 
the least competitive forms of energy generation, compromising other, sounder investments, and 
increasing the bill.150 The situation in the UK illustrates this trend. Criticisms to feed-in tariffs have led 
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to revised tariff rates that are projected to yield lower returns, especially compared to those in other 
EU Member States. Accordingly, the likelihood of depressed investments in renewable generation 
seem rather high.151 On the other hand, smart grids have the potential to render renewable energy 
more profitable through proper energy management, which should result in energy conservation.152 
Smart grids are very promising but may also impinge on the three main dimensions of energy security 
(sustainability, security of supply, and affordability in accordance with the vision of the Energy 
Union).153 
Another argument against subsidy schemes for renewable energy derives from the existence of the 
Emissions Trading System (ETS). The ETS is supposed to deliver on the climate front and thus renders 
renewable energy feed-in tariffs redundant. However, the ETS addresses climate policy goals 
appropriately only under determined circumstances which hardly apply in practice. First, energy 
technology choices are distorted by market and policy failures, which tilt the advantage towards 
business-as-usual solutions rather than facilitating the emergence of new technologies (such as 
distributed generation, smart meters, blockchain technologies, storage facilities, and electric vehicles) 
in the electricity system. Subsidies on renewables can be understood as mechanisms to counter 
distortions that perpetuate technological lock-in. Feed-in tariffs increase the availability of renewable 
energy, allowing stricter caps to be set in the ETS. Second, subsidies on renewables have the potential 
to reach other goals beyond climate change mitigation such as achieving renewable energy targets, 
gleaning other environmental benefits, improving air quality, strengthening security of supply, and 
boosting industrial policy and economic competitiveness.154   
Contemporary emphasis on extensive gas infrastructure clashes with the EU’s agenda on smart grid 
deployment. This friction can generate profound lock-in effects by obstructing a faster transition to 
low-carbon energy systems.155 The fact that half of the funding of the Connecting Europe Facility 
scheme is directed to two gas projects deemed to be of strategic importance is revealing of this 
dichotomy.156 The ongoing gas glut equips gas proponents with important arguments for its 
significance for the energy mix. Nevertheless, horizontal fracking constitutes a nocuous practice for 
the environment and produces higher emissions than conventional gas.157 The globalization of gas 
markets, facilitated by the shale revolution, meddles with global gas supply-demand equilibria. Such 
events are contributing to an increased gas import portfolio.  
 
2.4.2. Strengthening supply security   
While smart grids’ impact on sustainability, energy efficiency, affordability, and competitiveness has 
been considerably examined, security of supply remains an unexplored topic in relevant academic 
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The new energy architecture with smart grids at the center aims at strengthening security of supply 
and the energy markets’ resilience. A mix of solar, wind, and other renewable sources constitutes a 
much more decisive diversification policy than gas imports from alternative suppliers.159 The planned 
connection of EVs to smart grids can provide added resilience by enhancing congestion 
management.160 While the modern centralized electricity grid has been exposed to terrorist attacks, 
threatening physical security, the decentralized nature of smart grids makes any meaningful attack on 
energy infrastructure impossible.161 However, though the decentralized grid increases the level of 
resilience, it also increases the number of potential targets. Furthermore, new threats are emerging 
such as cyber and cyber-physical threats, targeting the massive use of ICT in network management. 
Energy poverty remains an urgent issue in the EU.162 Indeed, smart grids seem to be an ideal response 
to this problem. Self-consumption directly combats energy poverty at the root. Poor households can 
produce their energy and consume it rather than having to pay volatile prices.  
In introducing smart energy systems, EU Member States face a set of strategic choices.  First, Member 
States can decide whether to embark on a “make” or “buy” choice. The first choice (“make”) refers to 
Member State’s ability to produce electricity itself. The second choice (“buy”) is importing energy 
supplies. If a Member State can produce its own energy, it eradicates any dependencies. Further, 
favoring energy that is generated nationally will cascade into much needed domestic investment and 
generate new employment. The “make” option entails higher costs, at least for most Member States. 
The “buy” option offers efficiency and flexibility but retains some dependencies to external suppliers. 
What is more, the “buy” option will burden national economies. 
Second, EU Member States can opt for a centralized or de-centralized architecture of energy 
production. This requires Member States to:  
[d]ecide whether they prefer centrally or decentrally produced electricity and whether to 
rely on incumbent energy companies and grid operators or empower households and local 
communities with their own production and distribution networks (connected to the grid 
or not). If the distributed option is chosen, energy markets become locally oriented, likely 
to involve a mix of private and communal companies. This choice in generation capacity 
adds a strategic consideration within the make or buy context.163  
An important caveat regards flexibility and whether the reversion of the initial decision is likely and 
possible in the “make” option. For Member States opting to produce their own energy, a 
centralized architecture is more flexible since it can accommodate reversion to the “buy” option in 
case the “make” option underperforms. This is so because central grids can be connected to grids 
of other countries and hence carry imported energy from third countries. Importing energy is less 
functional and practical than producing it locally.164 
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The exact shape of smart grid deployment is significantly contextualized and contingent upon both 
local conditions and national regulation. A one-size-fits-all approach is unfeasible. In Greece, for 
example, geography plays a critical role in the energy security of the mainland on the one hand, and 
the myriad of islands on the other, calling for different treatment, as is reflected in Greece’s 
institutional energy structure and associated regulatory provisions.165 The existence of a big number 
of small islands in the Aegean Sea creates a strong rationale for autonomous energy generation since 
connection to the main grid is rather costly. Utilizing the rich potential of energy generation through 
strong winds and abundant solar irradiance could substantially boost indigenous energy generation.166 
A smart grid architecture that interconnects the grids of several adjacent islands and then creates 
interconnection points for these different groups of islands, most probably on the basis of existing 
administrative divisions, could also provide for the appropriate scale as well as offer interconnectivity 
options necessary to ensure strong security of supply. 
 
2.4.2.2. Risks and challenges ahead 
The evolution of smart grids also presents formidable challenges. The load in the electricity networks 
must be continually balanced to store electricity surplus during low demand spells and release it when 
demand increases. This can be achieved in two ways: through the maintenance of the supply and 
demand balance via market mechanisms or by means of adequate storage capacity. The low-carbon 
transition has been based on the proliferation of solar and wind energy. Both are intermittent in 
nature, which means that one would need storage capacity, thus raising the issue of what happens at 
the times when they underperform.167 Moreover, it is necessary to have large empty areas to produce 
solar energy at a large scale, especially because solar energy is already competitive with fossil fuels in 
sunny places.168 As the transition proceeds and renewable energy starts to play a central role in the 
energy mix, the continual supply-demand balancing is anticipated to take center stage. Sophisticated 
weather forecast tools will assist in predicting the supply side with increasing accuracy, thus providing 
benchmarks and minimizing uncertainties.    
These issues notwithstanding, in case of balancing failure, the result will be either load-shedding (in 
other words, a power cut) or increased electricity prices. Load-shedding amounts to a failure to 
provide supply security while increased electricity prices accentuate energy poverty and contravene 
the affordability goal.169 A concerted demand response management program is being developed to 
correct such mishaps in time and avert negative outcomes.170 Demand response management 
includes decentralized control automation, real-time and scarcity pricing, self-rationing, intra-day 
markets, and flexible, targeted contracts.171 At the same time, it allows consumers to take full control 
of their energy usage and optimize both the services they enjoy as well as the operation of smart grids.  
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While the emphasis remains on the capacity mechanism, the further development of cross-border 
trade and the optimization of available electricity across borders is a key issue.172 Poor data 
availability, sub-optimal coordination, and limited infrastructural interconnection result in prices that 
are not set at the right level.173 Thus, participants do not receive adequate market signals, which leads 
to the suboptimal delivery of electricity.174 Member States’ emphasis on national measures and tools 
to tackle security of supply risks accentuating the problem of loosely coordinated national electricity 
markets.175 Assuming the capacity mechanism is not ruled out in the following decades, it makes sense 
to move from national assessments to an EU adequacy assessment, and design multiple cross-border 
electricity flows accordingly.176  
The European Commission aims to deal with these shortcomings by introducing “a wider regional and 
European aspect first into the assessment of capacity needs” and seeking “to better coordinate 
national capacity mechanisms.”177 Under the new rules, all Member States are free to set their desired 
level of security of supply. However, these rules should be transparent and verifiable. More 
importantly, capacity mechanisms will be governed not just by state aid guidelines but also by a 
European framework that will mandate and regulate cross-border participation and eventually lead 
to integrated capacity markets in the EU.178 
The premise that smart grids and smart meters necessarily equate to quasi-automatic energy savings 
is not supported by recent research surveys.179 Indeed, these studies have moderate expectations. On 
the one hand, smart meters are found to provide a wealth of information to consumers. On the other, 
this AMI develops over time into a normal background monitor fully embedded in household routines 
and practices. Consequently, smart meters fail to continuously nudge consumers to further economize 
on energy. Usually, supplementary savings are hard to materialize beyond a certain threshold. The 
potential for additional energy savings is frustrated due to the absence of wider policy and market 
support.180 Considering the above, security of supply is in practice only marginally improved.  
 
2.4.3. Affordability and competitiveness gains in prosumer markets  
2.4.3.1. Advantages  
Europe’s energy systems require investments. There is evident discordance when it comes to which 
projects will be financed and which will be left out of the agenda.181 This is a fundamentally political 
conflict which impacts the allocation of funding and the distribution of benefits across corporate 
sectors.  
On the affordability front, smart grids can bring two positive results. First, a reduction of energy bills 
should arise from self-consumption and demand management. In turn, these will lead to lower energy 
quantities being transmitted from the grid. Second, prosumers have the option to install the 
infrastructure to generate their own energy. Prosumers can then sell their electricity surplus to 
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aggregators, DSOs, and other energy services companies.182  
An important benefit of smart grids vis-à-vis fossil fuel imports is the resulting predictability of prices. 
Fossil fuel prices are renowned for their volatile nature compared to renewable energy prices.183 
Abrupt increases in fluctuating energy prices create severe hurdles for the poorest citizens in the EU. 
There is a considerable disparity between the decreasing costs on renewable energy generation and 
the frequent boom and bust cycles of global energy markets.184 Smart grids may lead to higher prices 
in the case of ineffective load balancing. This raises the importance of developing effective demand 
response mechanisms that will optimize the benefits accruing from digital technologies.185  
 
2.4.3.2. Risks and challenges ahead  
In the absence of reliable electricity storage technologies, reserve capacity is ensured through capacity 
mechanisms. This policy tool puts a premium on electricity prices. The same is true of the priority 
dispatch mechanism, which prioritizes the utilization of renewable energy even when this is not the 
most competitive option. Therefore, it is safe to say that “structural changes to the design and 
operation of the power system are needed to ensure adequate incentives for investment and to 
integrate high shares of variable wind and solar power.”186  
Considering the underperformance of the ETS, the question of a carbon tax is of notable importance. 
The need to somehow put a price on carbon means that fossil fuels will be more expensive in the near 
future. There is hardly any rationale for investments in new coal-fired power plants to materialize. 
While one could argue that carbon pricing187 has been successfully kept at bay by influential fossil fuel 
corporations,188 two points should be considered. First, certainty is key in markets in general. It is for 
this reason that a price on carbon—one that can create a level-playing field and guide corporate 
policies for future decades—may transpire. Second, there are reasons for optimism in the wake of the 
open letter that six major energy companies signed prior to the Paris Agreement, asking for a carbon 
tax to be established.189 The setting of sub-national and regional emissions trading schemes around 
the world is arguably paving the way for such a tax.190  
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The above illustrates the complexity of policy-making in terms of subsidy mechanisms. This task is 
even more challenging considering that subsidy schemes can lead to significant market distortions. 
For example, national support schemes for renewable energy in Spain have led to huge tariff deficits 
in the domestic electricity market against which this EU Member State is still grappling.191 In turn, 
these distortions thwart adequate market signals to the detriment of consumers. A suggested course 
of action boils down to the gradual phase-out process that would naturally culminate in a carbon tax. 
This carbon tax should incentivize renewable energy generation instead of fossil fuels imports.192 
Alternatively, a feed-in premium tariff for renewable energy production should be placed as the only 
subsidy to further encourage renewable energy production when needed.  
The European Commission is renowned for its tough stance regarding subsidies and ensuing market 
distortions.193 In this context, it aims to replace capacity mechanisms by scarcity pricing. Not only 
would supply-demand dynamics not be disturbed, but scarcity pricing would also lead to the optimal 
operation of the electricity market.194 Indeed, demand response management maximizes network 
efficiency and minimizes associated costs, including capacity mechanisms. Such a development would 
constitute “a triple win – encouraging investment, enabling demand response and lessening the need 
for capacity mechanisms.”195  
A potential weakness resulting from effectively managing the electricity load at all times is that it may 
lead to higher prices, jeopardizing access to affordable energy. Energy politics are also against “perfect 
markets,” as controlled electricity markets are more conducive to government interests.196 This is 
because markets may lead to higher prices to reflect the state of supply and demand. However, this 
conflicts with the political aspirations of governments who want to meet their citizens’ expectations. 
Low electricity prices are a way to achieve this.  
More importantly, the advent of prosumer markets will mean that the same actors will have 
conflicting interests in their dual roles. On the one hand, prosumers will seek high prices for selling 
their electricity surplus, while on the other, they will prefer low prices for their energy usage. This 
contradiction may lead to sub-optimal profits from demand response schemes. At the same time, 
aggregators and other actors who can obtain significant market power may be able to reap the 
benefits of higher prices by passing them on to consumers, thereby neutralizing the benefits of 
demand response. A way out of this impasse may be through further emphasizing self-consumption. 
Hence, a fraction of households’ energy needs are covered by the energy they produce themselves, 
thereby mitigating the importance of prices. This will indeed mark the democratization of the energy 
system. Energy access will be, at least in part, directly provided without the mediation of market 
mechanisms that may yield adverse results.   
Broadly speaking, the rationale for prosumer markets draws from neo-classical economic 
presuppositions. However, such premises hardly apply in practical terms. Mainstream economics 
regard prosumers as rational actors that will endeavor to reach optimal energy consumption.197 
Prosumers have access to the necessary information to make the best decisions. Nevertheless, these 
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abstract expectations are usually frustrated in practice. This is because the average prosumer tends 
to display a limited capacity to process all the information, thereby falling short of maximizing his or 
her energy consumption.198 Indeed, the available data might prove to be more than a regular 
consumer can comprehend and subsequently amend consumption patterns in an optimal manner.199 
Considering the above, expecting prosumer markets to perform automatically is wishful thinking. 
Educating prosumers is necessary to reap all the benefits tendered by smart grids. Specific emphasis 
should be given to the social groups that are likely to need the most guidance, such as senior citizens. 
Bradley, Leach, and Torriti argue that the success of smart grid deployment relies on the trust between 
prosumers and other actors across the energy market.200 They assert that “to maximise benefits from 
DR [demand response], it must be ensured that implementation of smart metering and other 
technologies is done in such a way as to ensure trust, maximum customer acceptability and 
satisfaction as well as education along with implementation.”201  
The costs associated with the deployment of smart grids will be contingent on the degree of customer 
engagement and trust. Should customers fail to recognize the benefits offered by smart meters, it will 
be harder for customers to engage with the process and trust the corporate players implementing the 
roll-out. This would certainly lead to a suboptimal roll-out of smart meters. Higher costs, limited 
benefits, and a hugely mismanaged opportunity will result. 202 
The new architecture of smart grids currently leaves the competences of the amalgam of actors in a 
policy vacuum. While DSOs are anticipated to invest, there are hardly any incentives in place for them 
to do so. Conversely, the benefits of such investments accrue predominantly to suppliers and 
consumers as well as local and national authorities that can meet their climate targets. Providing 
compensation to DSOs to upscale the development of smart grids is hence the first necessary step.203 
Rationalizing these compensation schemes by considering access to energy as tantamount to a public 
good may enhance the reception of such schemes among citizens.204 What should be considered in-
depth is the question of who pays for hedging against emergencies. Peak prices and scarcity pricing 
places costs on consumers. The development of storage capacity (e.g., EVs) adds an additional layer 
of costs that can either be funded through tariffs or passed on through retail prices. Hence, taxpayers 
pay for this. The same is true for capacity mechanisms.  
 
2.5. CONCLUSION  
The overhaul of the energy systems through the implementation of smart grids is crucial to drive the 
EU’s low-carbon transition. While the smart grids’ benefits make large-scale deployment compelling 
across the sustainability, security of supply, and affordability fronts, caveats remain and call for 
caution by policy-makers.  
In conclusion, smart grids entail several benefits as they create the conditions for the proliferation of 
renewable energy generation; allow for self-consumption; boost energy efficiency via demand 
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response; alleviate energy poverty; lead to decreases in fossil fuel imports; decrease dependence on 
unreliable oil and gas suppliers, and volatile prices; promote low-carbon energy security; and boost 
aggregate demand.  
On the negative side, smart grids require high upfront investments costs; call for large-scale citizens’ 
engagement, incentivization and education; presuppose functional markets; and require high 
attention on cybersecurity issues. The transition to the new energy architecture may also generate 
supplementary adverse results, such as higher prices, abuse of market power, and increase in overall 
energy consumption. These possibilities create the need to communicate these likely outcomes to 
European citizens in a timely and efficient manner, devise relevant policy tools, and engage with the 
emerging prosumers.   
 
As the deployment of smart grids and the energy transition constitute uncharted waters, there is a 
voluminous regulatory vacuum. For instance, the role of both TSOs and DSOs remains unclear in the 
new energy setting. The emergence of integrated energy services companies, aggregators, and 
energy co-operatives is also going to be determined to a great extent by future regulation. How 
cross-border markets will develop is another unresolved issue. The roll-out of smart meters also 
raises critical questions regarding data privacy that go to the root of human rights issues. Finally, the 
policy tools that will incentivize renewable energy generation and pave the way for a cleaner future 
are of central importance. Feed-in tariffs, feed-in premiums, and a carbon tax can all provide stimuli 
to the cause. 
3. SMART GRID REGULATION  
3.1.  SMART METERING: PAVING THE WAY FOR SMARTER GRIDS 
3.1.1. Background 
“Smart grids” can be defined in a variety of ways. The following definition is proposed by the European 
Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) and used also by the Council of European Energy 
Regulators (CEER) and the Commission:  
A smart grid is an electricity network that can cost-efficiently integrate the behaviour and 
actions of all users connected to it – generators, consumers and those that do both – in order 
to ensure economically efficient, sustainable power systems with low losses and high levels 
of quality and security of supply and safety.205  
It might be interesting to note that this definition does not define smart grids by the kind of technology 
used. The term describes the complex connection between electricity generation, transmission, 
distribution, utilization, and information communication platforms via a system of sensors and other 
equipment across various levels of the electricity market.206 One major purpose of smart grids is to 
target future behavior of the most important grid user, namely the consumer, with a view to finding 
more means to use energy when and where necessary, and under more convenient conditions. 
Smart metering issues are of course related to smart grid issues. Yet, while smart meters are enablers 
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for smart grids, they are merely one of many components of a smart grid. The ERGEG suggests that it 
is technically possible to develop smart grids and to roll out smart meters independently of each 
other.207 Indeed, smart grids represent an amalgam of existing energy infrastructure and new 
information technology. Consequently, smart grid regulation transcends energy law and policy; it 
represents a balance between promoting the development of new technologies aimed at promoting 
the development of renewable energy, and the need to protect consumers and consumer interests.  
 
3.1.2. The EU legal basis 
Historically, the first legally binding instrument mentioning smart grids was the Measuring 
Instruments Directive.208 It established the requirements for the deployment and use of instruments 
for measuring water, gas, electricity, and heat.209 More recently, the Third Energy Package,210 adopted 
in 2009, which seeks to further integrate the EU energy market, set out a more detailed agenda for 
the development of smart grids.211 It enjoins Member States, subject to a positive cost-benefit 
analysis, to ensure the roll-out of smart meters. The implementation of intelligent metering systems 
aims to facilitate the active participation of consumers in electricity markets. Directive 2009/72/EC 
states that subject to an economic assessment of all the long-term costs and benefits to be conducted 
by September 2012, the Member States or any competent authority they designate shall prepare a 
timetable with a target of up to 10 years for the roll-out of smart meters.212 Where the assessment is 
positive, at least 80% of consumers shall be equipped with smart meters by 2020.213   
While the Directive is not an obligation on Member States to introduce smart grids, Article 3(10)- 
(11)214 represents the legal foundation on which Member States can facilitate the development and 
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deployment of smart grids. The Directive also includes rules designed to benefit European energy 
consumers and protect their rights. One of these rights is the right to choose or change suppliers 
without extra charges. To make this a reality, a review of the existing technical and operational 
landscapes, together with their attendant regulatory framework is required. 
The patchwork of binding directives set out in the Third Energy Package is further supplemented by 
several non-binding policy instruments, opinions, and recommendations issued by various EU 
institutions, including the Digital Agenda for Europe (2010),215 the European Commission’s policy 
document “Smart Grids: from innovation to deployment,” and the Commission’s recommendation on 
the preparation for the roll-out of smart metering.216 
 
3.1.3. Current status in Europe 
According to a 2014 study conducted in 27 European states by the CEER, 42% of participating countries 
already had a strategic roadmap to implement smart grids.217 Expressed in absolute numbers, 10 
countries had established such plans, while 17 had not.218 Table 1 provides an overview of smart grid 
implementation plans across European States. Specifically, Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Greece, Luxembourg, and Norway published national implementation plans. In 11 of the countries, 
these plans were established at the national level, while in Belgium, this plan is being developed at 
local levels.219 Implementation plans were not created, for example, in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, 
and Spain. Although Great Britain had not established an implementation plan, it did develop a high-
level route-map, which is the responsibility of the national GB Smart Grid Forum.220 There is no 
convergence across Europe in terms of timeframe for the implementation of smart grids. In most of 
them, national governments and DSOs are responsible for implementation, while National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs) have monitoring functions.221 
As far as actual implementation is concerned, Italy is a forerunner. Italy has completed smart metering 
implementation covering 99% of electronic metering points.222 The DSO is the owner and responsible 
                                                            
(11) In order to promote energy efficiency, Member States or, where a Member State has so provided, the regulatory 
authority shall strongly recommend that electricity undertakings optimise the use of electricity, for example by providing 
energy management services, developing innovative pricing formulas, or introducing intelligent metering systems or smart 
grids, where appropriate. 
215 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital Agenda for Europe, Brussels, 26 August 2010, COM (2010) 245 
final/2. 
216 Commission Recommendation of 9 March 2012 on preparations for the roll-out of smart metering, COM(2012) 1342 final, 
2012/148/EU, OJ L 73, 13.2.2012, pp. 9-22. 
217 Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER), “CEER Status Review on European Regulatory Approaches Enabling Smart 
Grids Solutions ("Smart Regulation"),” CEER, C13-EQS-57-04, Brussels, p.7, 2014. 
218 Since the publication of the CEER Report, Greece and Romania have implemented national programmes for the roll out 
of smart grids. See also: European Technology Platform (ETP), “National and Regional Smart Grids initiatives in Europe; 
Cooperation opportunities among Europe's active platforms,” Brussels, 2016. 
219 For instance, the Flemish government approved the concept note “Digital meters: roll-out in Flanders” on 3 February 
2017. The Flemish regulatory body VREG was asked by the Flemish government to update its earlier cost-benefit-analysis on 
the basis of the principles of the new concept note. VREG concluded that the roll-out of the smart meters in Flanders would 
be a correct policy decision. See VREG, “Kosten-batenanalyse slimme meters,” VREG, 18 May 2017. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.vreg.be/nl/nieuws/kosten-batenanalyse-slimme-meters. [Accessed 11 July 2017]. 
220 Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER), “CEER Status Review on European Regulatory Approaches Enabling Smart 
Grids Solutions ("Smart Regulation"),” CEER, C13-EQS-57-04, Brussels, p.17, 2014. 
221 Ibid., pp.7, 17. 
222 GEODE, “From Theory to Reality,” in GEODE Workshop, Brussels, p. 9, 2014; European Commission, Cost-benefit analyses 
& state of play of smart metering deployment in the EU-27, Brussels: EC SWD(2014) 189, p.33, 2014. 
 31 
party for implementing the smart grid and for guaranteeing power quality.223 Remarkably, the Italian 
implementation is not merely aimed at achieving a roll-out of AMIs, but envisages their progressive 
improvement. For instance, given that the low voltage remote control meters that were first rolled 
out in 2001 have a lifespan of fifteen years, the first replacement campaign was launched in 2016.224 
These first generation (1G) meters have since reached their end-of-life. True to expectation, some 
companies have started installing 2G meters. The Italian experience is also a regulatory paragon 
because the law laid down functional specifications for 2G meters and identifies some crucial criteria. 
The requirements include: 2G meters, once installed, shall remain in operation, presumably, for 
another 15 years; and, over this period, they must be able to support every electric system 
transformation, such as the new distributed production paradigm and the changes of the electricity 
market.225 
Other countries, such as Spain, have not developed an implementation plan for smart grids. Yet, the 
roll-out of smart meters is ongoing and is planned to be completed by 2018.226 
 
Country National or local level Details 
Austria  National level  National Smart Grids Technology Platform 
(www.smartgrids.at), published roadmap in 2010  




Croatia  No  
Cyprus  National level  
Czech Republic  No  Under construction.  
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France  National level  Published by the Energy Agency (ADEME), current 




Germany  No  
Great Britain  No  High-level route map has been developed.  
Greece  National level  
Hungary  No  
Italy  National level  Incentives were deliberated by the energy authority 
(AEEG-SI) in 2010: 
http://www.autorita.energia.it/it/docs/10/039-
10arg.htm  
The latest update concerns the second generation of 
smart meters, published in August 2016: 
http://www.autorita.energia.it/it/docs/dc/15/416-
15.jsp 
Lithuania  No  




Norway  National level  www.nve.no/ams  
Poland  No  
Portugal  No  
Romania National level http://www.anre.ro/ro/legislatie/smart-metering 
Slovenia  No  Under construction.  
Spain No  
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Sweden  National  A roadmap with recommendations on how to stimulate 
the deployment of smart grids for the years 2015 to 
2030 is currently under construction by the Swedish 
Coordination Council for Smart Grid 
(http://www.swedishsmartgrid.se). Due date 
December 2014.  
Switzerland  No  
The Netherlands  No  There is a vision document from the Taskforce Smart 




 Table 1 – Development of smart grid implementation plans in European Member States 
Source: adaption and update of CEER Status Review on European Regulatory Approaches Enabling 
Smart Grids Solutions (“Smart Regulation”). C13-EQS-57-04, 18-Feb-2014, pp.42-43 
 
With a view to promoting smart grids, many Member States have adopted regulatory incentives. In 
the CEER study, 79% of the countries were found to use tools for price regulation and 63% use 
performance indicators. In contrast, tools to regulate the provision of information, charges, and 
licensing are used significantly less. In most of the countries (76%), regulatory instruments will need 
to be adapted to facilitate the deployment of smart grids.227 For example, in Belgium, as of 2018, Atrias 
will provide a new clearing house with new MIG6 market protocol implementation. This means that 
from 2018 onwards, new market models for prosumers with PV<10 kW peak will be established, 
making dynamic tariffs and sale of injection possible.228 In Great Britain, the value of demand side 
flexibility for the electricity system will have to be reflected in the incentives to invest in smart grids.229 
In Lithuania, reaping the benefits of smart grids and managing related data privacy issues will require 
amendments to the current regulatory framework. In Italy, an “input-based” type of incentive 
regulation has been used for the transmission network as well as to support smart grid pilot projects 
in distribution networks. In Poland, in order to assess the benefits of smart metering for consumers, 
two new performance indicators were introduced. In Spain, the deployment of smart meters is 
ongoing, and it is viewed as a necessary step towards the development of smart grids. As part of 
Spain’s efforts, the low voltage code has been proposed to be changed and a new discriminatory tariff 
that, thanks to smart meters, promotes charging of EVs at times of lower demand and prices has been 
established.230 Despite what appear to be wide-spread attempts at regulatory reform within the 
continent, some actors in some of these market believe that regulatory reform may not be necessary 
as the current regime already provides an enabling ground for smart grids.231 While this may be true 
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in some cases, the reality is that the existing regimes for electricity regulation are skewed towards the 
traditional grid and do not take into account the dynamic nature of smart grids.232 Consequently, if 
smart grids are to be afforded an opportunity to enter what is currently often an oligopolistic market, 
regulatory reform will be essential.   
Given that smart grids are largely experimental, demonstration projects have played a pivotal role in 
the development and deployment of the new technologies developed. Different countries in Europe 
have adopted various approaches towards promoting these demonstration projects. 61% of countries 
which participated in the CEER study use a combination of sources for funding.233 56% of the countries 
have been funding demonstration projects through industry funding, public funding institutions, the 
European Commission, and integrated municipal energy suppliers.234 In 61% of the countries, 
governments are responsible for making decisions about granting funds.235 For example, Finland 
passes costs onto consumers to a certain extent, but also adopts efficiency targets for companies.236 
Italy uses a cost-benefit indicator to select projects.237 Austria finances demonstration projects 
through a combination of funding from industry, public institutions, and the national budget.238 The 
federal government established the Climate and Energy Fund (Klima- und Energiefonds - KLIEN) to 
support the implementation of the climate strategy. KLIEN is responsible for providing most of the 
funds for demonstration projects.239 Remaining costs are audited and covered through network 
charges during the regulatory period, with the application of efficiency targets. Great Britain does not 
apply efficiency targets to demonstration projects.240 However, a key criterion for awarding funding is 
the project’s value for consumers and its long-term efficiency. The NRA, rather than the government, 
is responsible for most decisions.241  
Regarding more general incentives to encourage DSOs to adopt and fund smart grid innovation 
projects and how they are funded, most European countries use a combination of regulatory 
mechanisms, national government initiatives, and European initiatives. 63% of the countries assessed 
by CEER use general incentives not specific to smart grids to promote the development of smart 
grids.242 For example, Austria incentivizes cost reductions through efficiency targets that do not 
distinguish between traditional and smart grids. As a result, regulated companies favor smart solutions 
when they are more cost efficient than other alternatives. Belgium has not yet specifically defined 
incentives, while Cyprus currently has no incentives in place. In the majority of countries, incentives 
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for DSOs to innovate are funded through distribution network charges. National and European funding 
is also used to a significant extent. Many European countries adopt a combination of sources of 
funding. For instance, Austria, Finland, Italy, and France use network charges, national funding, and 
European funding. The Netherlands, Poland, and Norway use network charges as well as national 
funding. Lithuania and Slovenia use network charges and European funding. Greece and Spain use 
European as well as national funding.243  
Finally, with regard to issues of data privacy and security, it is a commonly held view that the 
technology associated with smart grids poses significant risks to data privacy and cybersecurity; both 
require concerted regulatory reform if these risks are to be adequately managed.244 However, 
according to the CEER status review on European regulatory approaches enabling smart grids 
solutions, there is no clear consensus about whether NRAs for the energy sector will and should be 
responsible for data security regulation in relation to smart meter data.245 Be that as it may, different 
countries are considering different proposals and approaches for dealing with the problem of data 
protection and security for smart grids. For example, in the UK, data aggregation plans will be 
proposed by the DSO and then approved by the NRA, and data privacy requirements will be regulated 
in the context of license conditions.246 In Slovenia, a cost-benefit analysis carried out by the NRA will 
also look at security issues.247 In Spain, energy suppliers are precluded from having access to any 
information other than that of their own customers.248 In contrast, in the Czech Republic, the Office 
for Personal Data Protection is responsible for data security.249 Similarly, in France there is a separate 
and dedicated agency with competence over data security. In Germany, this is the responsibility of 
the Federal Office for Information Security.250 Finally, in countries such as Belgium and the 
Netherlands, the NRA for the energy sector and the Data Protection Authority will work jointly on data 
security issues.251 
The ERGEG Guidelines of Good Practice on regulatory aspects of smart metering recommend that:  
it is always the customer that chooses in what way metering data should be used and by 
whom, with the exception of metering data required to fulfil regulated duties and within the 
national market model. The principle should be that the party requesting information shall 
state what information is needed, with what frequency and will then obtain the customer’s 
approval for this. Furthermore, full transparency on existing customer data should be the 
general principle.252  
Table 2, from the CEER status review of regulatory aspects of smart metering, shows that many 
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European countries indeed provide customers with information about, and ensure control over, their 
metering data, free of charge. However, the same table also shows that, in a number of countries, 





 In control and informed  
In control and not 
informed  
No control over 
data 
Not available 
Free  AT, BE, DK, FI, 
FR, DE, GB, IE, 
IT, LU, NO, PL, 
NL  
 
Not free   
 
 
Table 2 – Data privacy and security regulation in European Member States 
Source: CEER Status Review of Regulatory Aspects of Smart Metering. C13-RMF-54-05, 12 
September 2013, p.16 
 
3.1.4. Towards regulatory policy recommendations 
The most relevant issues now revolve around network planning, priorities about grid reinforcement, 
and the ways DSOs are incentivized by national regulation to invest in smart grids. In simplified terms, 
one crucial issue concerns how to convince DSOs to test and innovate more. The “obvious” answer 
seems to lie in the regulatory incentives set by the NRAs. Yet, these agencies must also protect 
consumers from potentially excessive charges that natural monopolists such as DSOs could charge. 
This problem might be made even more acute when DSOs are state-owned and a major source of 
public revenue. Therefore, a balance must be struck between incentivizing DSOs to invest in smart 
grids and avoiding the imposition of high tariffs on consumers. Another important concern is the 
possibility of conflicts of interest between DSOs and self-producers. The desire of DSOs to optimize 
the economic benefits of grid utilization inherently conflicts with the idea of self-production. 
Consequently, without regulatory interventions, DSOs would be opposed to the development of 
technology that potentially affects their bottom line.254 To achieve this, the support of the DSOs who 
have historically benefitted from the status quo is required.255 Indeed, as has been demonstrated in 
Italy, DSOs are capable if the enabling environment is created to spearhead the desired change. 
The European Commission as well as CEER and ERGEG hold that DSOs should be “market 
facilitators.”256 The notion of a market facilitator in this context means that DSOs should play a crucial 
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role in setting up and managing the infrastructure necessary to perform new services, for example, 
demand side and load aggregation functions. But they should not be directly involved in the provision 
of such functions, which instead should be left to actors competing against each other (e.g., suppliers, 
aggregators, and Energy Service Companies (ESCOs)). 
An additional set of regulatory challenges relate to the use of, and access to, smart meter data for 
smart grids. In most EU Member States, smart grids will make use of, and indeed rely on, smart meter 
data and infrastructure. In general, how consumers’ data will be managed and by whom will have to 
be clearly explained. Otherwise, concern about privacy issues will be inevitable. Indeed, access to, as 
well as ownership of, data appear to be the key issues. These are not specific to the energy sector 
alone, but represent challenges that have been discussed thoroughly in other domains from which 
lessons may be drawn, such as “big data,”257 which may be very useful for environmental performance 
improvement and therefore presents a big opportunity. While the regulatory nature of data 
protection for smart grids remains unclear, it seems likely that national bodies (e.g., independent 
regulatory agencies for energy), will play a central role. Regulators and policymakers more generally 
can learn from other sectors which have already had to face similar issues (e.g., internet search 
engines).  
It is also important to consider the standardization of smart grid technology with a view to improving 
the security and integrity of the infrastructure. Although the smart grids’ various components are at 
different levels of development, the concept  of standardizing smart grid technology envisages their 
interconnection. Consequently, the absence of minimum technological requirements might result in, 
or facilitate the development of, vulnerabilities such as cyber-attacks. Similarly, situations where 
substandard assets that interface with a smart grid network and inhibit the smooth operation of the 
network or damage it are not inconceivable. For instance, smart grids connected to home 
communication networks could pose safety risks during lightning storms if the ground reference for 
equipment such as a smart meters and phone lines differ. The resulting high voltage surge through 
devices connected to the network could not only damage the equipment but pose severe 
electrocution risks.258 Granted that standardization may occur at different levels, differing national 
standards increase costs, which are often passed on to consumers. It may therefore be prudent for 
the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER)259 to take the lead on standardization 
efforts and provide an international framework to guide national, local, or enterprise-based 
standardization, and perhaps delineate the relevant levels of standardization. This will go a long way 
towards facilitating international interoperability and the market integration efforts of the EU.260 
Furthermore, a significant barrier to smart grid deployment would be insufficient, or lack of, consumer 
demand for such technology. Given fears associated with cybersecurity, government espionage, and 
data protection, as well as public skepticism on the utility of such technology, concerted action must 
be taken to create sufficient awareness to tackle this barrier. It is therefore critical that more 
information be provided to citizens about the benefits of smart grids, and specifically about why smart 
meters are being deployed. This would increase consumer awareness and engagement in energy 
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markets and, in turn, facilitate the development of smart grids. 
   
3.2. DEMAND RESPONSE  
3.2.1. Background 
Demand response is defined by ACER as “changes in electric usage by end-use consumers from their 
normal load patterns in response to changes in electricity prices and/or incentive payments designed 
to adjust electricity usage, or in response to the acceptance of the consumer’s bid, including through 
aggregation.”261 It has increasingly gained prominence as a tool to improve energy efficiency and the 
reliability of grids through the lowering of demand, especially during peak periods. 
Demand response programs can be divided into two types: implicit and explicit demand response.262 
In price-based (implicit) demand response, consumers choose to become exposed to time-varying 
prices that reflect the value and cost of electricity at different time periods. Thus, consumers do not 
pay fixed prices but rather respond to wholesale market price variations and/or dynamic grid fees. 
Such flexible prices for consumers do not necessarily require “aggregators.”263 
In contrast, in incentive-based (explicit) schemes, consumers receive direct payments to change their 
consumption patterns upon request. This can be triggered by activation of balancing energy, 
differences in prices of electricity, or grid constraints. Consumers may earn from their consumption 
flexibility by acting individually or by contracting with an aggregator, which in turn might be either a 
third party or the customer’s supplier. Aggregated demand side resources are then traded in the 
wholesale, balancing, and/or capacity markets.  
Aggregators are new actors within the European electricity markets, occasioned by the new market 
design heralded by the Third Energy Package. They are service providers that employ demand facilities 
to sell pooled loads of electricity. As their name suggests, they perform the function of “aggregating” 
flexibility. They agree with industrial, commercial, and/or residential consumers to aggregate their 
capacity to reduce energy and/or shift loads on short notice. They then create a “pool” of aggregated 
controllable load, made up of smaller consumer loads. Finally, they sell the pooled load as a single 
resource to system operators, which use it for their technical needs. Aggregation allows smaller 
consumers who are excluded from the markets due to the size of their loads to participate in the 
markets.264 It should be noted that while load aggregators are new actors emerging in several power 
markets in Europe, load aggregation is a service which might be performed by a variety of actors. This 
goes well beyond load aggregators to include “traditional” suppliers or other new companies (e.g., 
ESCOs). It is important to note that the two distinct forms of demand response are not necessarily 
substitutes. Indeed, customers might well participate in incentive-based demand response through 
either an aggregator or a “traditional” supplier and, at the same time, participate in a price-based 
demand response program based on time-varying prices.265 Beyond “aggregating” consumers 
(demand), aggregators also have a role to play in “aggregating” prosumers (consumption, production, 
and storage).  
Given that demand response gives rise to complex relationships between energy suppliers, customers, 
aggregators, and BRPs, a critical examination of the implications of these relationships is necessary to 
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develop a suitable regulatory framework that enables and facilitates market participation for these 
actors and ensures that the full benefit of demand response mechanisms are reaped. 
 
3.2.2. The EU legal basis  
The Third Legislative Package provides a supranational legal foundation for the development of 
demand response in Europe. Article 3(10) of the directive on the common rules for the internal market 
enjoined Member States to adopt, amongst others, “demand-side management” measures as part of 
efforts to combat climate change and improve energy security. Further progress was made with the 
Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU),266 Article 15(4) of which requires Member States to: 
ensure the removal of those incentives in transmission and distribution tariffs that are 
detrimental to the overall efficiency (including energy efficiency) of the generation, 
transmission, distribution and supply of electricity or those that might hamper participation 
of demand response, in balancing markets and ancillary services procurement.267  
It also requires Member States to:  
ensure that network operators are incentivised to improve efficiency in infrastructure design 
and operation, and, within the framework of Directive 2009/72/EC, that tariffs allow 
suppliers to improve consumer participation in system efficiency, including demand 
response, depending on national circumstances.268 
Furthermore, Article 15(8) of the Directive, establishes that:  
Member States shall ensure that national regulatory authorities encourage demand side 
resources, such as demand response, to participate alongside supply in wholesale and retail 
markets. Subject to technical constraints inherent in managing networks, Member States shall 
ensure that TSOs and DSOs, in meeting requirements for balancing and ancillary services, treat 
demand response providers, including aggregators, in a non-discriminatory manner, on the 
basis of their technical capabilities. Subject to technical constraints inherent in managing 
networks, Member States shall promote access to and participation of demand response in 
balancing, reserves and other system services markets, inter alia by requiring national 
regulatory authorities […] in close cooperation with demand service providers and consumers, 
to define technical modalities for participation in these markets on the basis of the technical 
requirements of these markets and the capabilities of demand response. Such specifications 
shall include the participation of aggregators.269  
The set of rules (“network codes”) drafted by the European Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) also emphasizes the importance of promoting demand 
response.270 These rules are based on Framework Guidelines from ACER, which are based on priorities 
set by the European Commission. Specifically, the ACER Framework Guidelines on Electricity Balancing 
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provide that “[t]hese terms and conditions . . . including the underlying requirements, shall, in 
particular, be set in order to facilitate the participation of demand response, renewable and 
intermittent energy sources in the balancing markets.”271 
Finally, the Commission Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020, 
in clarifying the conditions under which Member States are allowed to introduce “capacity 
remuneration mechanisms,” requests Member States to consider alternatives such as demand 
response.272 Specifically, the Guidelines state that: 
Member States should therefore primarily consider alternative ways of achieving generation 
adequacy which do not have a negative impact on the objective of phasing out 
environmentally or economically harmful subsidies, such as facilitating demand side 
management and increasing interconnection capacity.273  
Furthermore, “the measure should be open and provide adequate incentives to both existing and 
future generators and to operators using substitutable technologies, such as demand-side response 
or storage solutions.”274 In addition: 
the measure should be designed in a way so as to make it possible for any capacity which can 
effectively contribute to addressing the generation adequacy problem to participate in the 
measure, in particular, taking into account the following factors: the participation of 
generators using different technologies and of operators offering measures with equivalent 
technical performance, for example demand side management, interconnectors and 
storage.275 
These supranational frameworks are designed to ensure that fundamental modalities required for the 
successful deployment of demand mechanisms are possible. These modalities fall into three 
categories: the legal recognition of demand response, thereby allowing consumer loads to compete 
with other generation assets in all markets; the legalization and enablement of aggregation services 
in the markets; and the adjustment of technical specifications in recognition of consumer capabilities 
and requirements.276 The transposition period for the Energy Efficiency Directive expired in June 
2014.277 The expectation was that, by this date, the modalities necessary for implementation across 
Member States would have been in place. 
  
3.2.3. Current status in Europe 
The CEER’s study on regulatory approaches for smart grids revealed that, in order to promote demand 
response, 71% of the European countries sampled use static time of use tariffs and 58% of them use 
load control to incentivize demand side response.278 In countries such as Italy, load control is limited 
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to large industrial customers through remote means.279 In countries such as Belgium, different types 
of load control are used by the TSO in the tertiary reserve ancillary services of TSO Elia. In countries 
such as Greece, there are differential tariffs for peak and off-peak consumption for households.280 
However, not all European States apply “price signals” to induce customers to change their 
consumption patterns.  
Figure 1 maps the status of incentive-based (explicit) demand response in Europe as of 2015. The 
assessment carried out by the Smart Energy Demand Coalition (SEDC)281 was based on the following 
four criteria: enabling consumer participation and aggregation, appropriate program requirements, 
fair and standardized measurement and verification requirements, and equitable payment and risk 
structures.282 Overall, the SEDC suggests that, in Europe, incentive-based (explicit) demand response 
is still in its early development.283  In a few cases, the SEDC suggests that markets do not permit 
consumer participation and are therefore “closed” to explicit demand response.284 European 
countries have widely varying regulatory frameworks, each with its own participation requirements 
and rules. There generally are no standardized contractual arrangements governing the roles and 
responsibilities of the distinct actors involved. Furthermore, it is often impossible, or even illegal, to 
aggregate consumers’ flexibility in practice.285 
In some countries, demand response is a commercially viable product. For example, in Belgium, 
demand response can participate in a number of balancing markets, namely the primary and tertiary 
reserves.286 However, a key obstacle is the requirement for aggregators to get the prior agreement of 
the customer’s supplier or BRP287 in order to be able to contract with the customer.288 There are at 
least two private aggregators active on the market (“Restore.eu” and “Actility”) as well as a tertiary 
off-take reserve scheme specifically for aggregators (“Dynamic Profile”).289  
Great Britain is deemed to have competitive energy markets and open balancing markets, though the 
emerging capacity market has raised uncertainties for demand response. Great Britain was the first 
EU Member State to open many of its electricity markets to the demand side.290 Currently, all 
balancing markets allow the participation of demand response in general and aggregated load in 
particular.291 However, according to the SEDC, the UK’s measurement, baseline, bidding, and other 
procedural and operational requirements are not appropriate. Thus, even though the markets are 
formally open, in practice, results in terms of demand-side participation have been worsening over 
                                                            
279 Ibid. 
280 Hellenic Public Power Company SA (PPC), “Residential Night Tariff,” PPC, 2013. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.dei.gr/en/oikiakoi-pelates/timologia/oikiako-timologio-me-xronoxrewsi-oikiako-nuxterino. [Accessed 4 July 
2017]. 
281 Smart Energy Demand Coalition, “Mapping Demand Response in Europe Today,” Brussels, pp.8-12, 2015.  
282 J. M. R. Fernandez et al., “Renewable generation versus demand-side management. A comparison for the Spanish 
market,” Energy Policy, vol. 96, pp. 458-470, 2016. 
283 Smart Energy Demand Coalition, “Mapping Demand Response in Europe Today,” Brussels, 2015. 
284 Id. 
285 Ibid., pp.11. 
286 Ibid. pp. 47-54; REstore, “Belgian TSO Elia in demand response first,” 5 September 2016. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.restore.eu/export/pdfNews/113. [Accessed 6 September 2017]. 
287 Given that market players have an implicit responsibility to balance the electricity system, the balance responsible parties 
are financially responsible for keeping their own position (sum of their injections, withdrawals and trades) balanced over a 
given timeframe. 
288 Smart Energy Demand Coalition (SEDC) Mapping Demand Response in Europe Today – 2015, p.47. 
289 Ibid., p.51. 
290 Ibid., p.85. 
291 Ibid.; PA Consulting, “OFGEM: Aggregators - Barriers and External Impacts,” PA Consulting, London, 2016. 
 42 
time.292 Furthermore, the capacity remuneration mechanism introduced in 2014 is said not to place 
demand-side resources on a “level playing field” with generation resources. Indeed, only one demand-
side aggregator out of around 15 operating in the market managed to secure a contract in the first 
capacity market auction.293 
France and Switzerland have redrafted their program requirements and defined clear roles and 
responsibilities precisely to allow independent aggregation.294 
 
Figure 1 – Map of incentive-based (explicit) demand response development in Europe today 
Source: Smart Energy Demand Coalition (SEDC) Mapping Demand Response in Europe Today – 
2015, p. 9. 
 
Other European countries still present important regulatory barriers, notably program participation 
requirements not yet tailored for both generation and demand-side resources. For example, Austria 
requires consumers to install a secure and dedicated telephone line in order to participate in the 
balancing market.295 Norway requires TSO signals to be delivered over the phone, thus making the 
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minimum bid-size high.296 As a result, the participation of consumers other than large industrial 
consumers is hindered.297 Similarly, technical and organizational rules do not consider some of the 
requirements for the provision of balancing services in sufficient detail.298 This includes the negative 
impact of complex and lengthy approval procedures and their associated costs on market entry and 
participation. 
In still other European countries, aggregated demand response is either illegal or its development is 
seriously hindered due to regulatory barriers. For example, in Italy, the notion of load aggregator is 
not formally recognized and no regulatory framework currently exists.299 Poland and Spain do not 
seem to be taking the steps required to foster the development of incentive-based (explicit) demand 
response.300 Indeed, load aggregators do not exist in every EU Member State. The analogous 
consideration applies to regulatory frameworks governing their operation. 
Italy relies mostly on hydro and gas generation to satisfy its flexibility requirements, while the 
framework governing consumer participation in balancing markets has not been set up yet. 
Interruptible contracts are a partial exception and constitute a dedicated demand response 
program.301 Load aggregation is not allowed, nor is there currently any regulatory framework in place 
to govern such activity.302 Yet, the strategic guidelines for the period of 2015-2018 published by the 
NRA included an evaluation of demand-side mechanisms and hence might reflect the possible opening 
of balancing markets to demand response.303 
Like Italy, Spain also uses mainly hydro and gas generation for its flexibility needs.304 Even though 
some smart grid pilot projects are currently being developed, incentive-base (explicit) demand 
response is currently modest. Even though there is one interruptible load program that allows 
incentive-based (explicit) demand response, the scheme is only open to large consumers and has not 
been used for years. Importantly, load aggregation is illegal. Yet, proposals to open balancing markets 
to demand response could prompt changes in 2016-2018, especially in light of the smart meter roll-
out expected by 2018.305 
 
3.2.4. Towards regulatory policy recommendations  
Overall main regulatory barriers found repeatedly across European countries include: 
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1. Demand response might not be accepted as a flexibility resource: in some European 
countries wholesale, balancing and/or capacity markets do not accept aggregated demand as 
a flexibility resource.306  
2. Inadequate and/or non-standardized baselines: in some European countries, standardized 
measurement and baseline methodologies are absent. Current methodologies are designed 
for generators and, consequently, do not accurately measure changes in consumption. This 
could hinder demand response, because consumers might not receive adequate payment for 
their flexibility.307  
3. Technology-biased program requirements: program participation requirements, historically 
designed for national generation, might not include demand side resources.308 Power markets 
more in line with demand response timeframes have to be established (e.g., based on 15- 
rather than 60-minute timeframes).309 
4. Aggregation services are not fully enabled: prequalification, registration, and measurement 
may still be conducted at the level of individual consumers, rather than at the level of pooled 
loads brought together by the aggregator, which hinders entry by placing heavy administrative 
and legal burdens on individual consumers.310 Moreover, there is often no real definition of 
load aggregators. To promote the possibility for consumers to contract with aggregators, load 
aggregators must be legally acknowledged as facilitators of demand side flexibility.  
5. Aggregators, where existing, are currently active at the high and medium voltage levels, 
rather than the low voltage level: load aggregators exist in some countries, such as France 
and Belgium. Yet, their activities are currently focused on the high and medium voltage levels, 
namely at transmission and dealing with TSOs. We therefore must learn how these activities 
might be translated, if at all, at the low voltage level, namely at distribution and when dealing 
with DSOs. 
6. Lack of necessary infrastructure: while there is much discussion about the emergence of load 
aggregators, it must not be forgotten that aggregators rely on certain infrastructures to 
provide load aggregation services. The key step here is to install smart meters, which in some 
of the European member states are not yet deployed.311  
7. Lack of standardized processes between consumers, BRPs, and aggregators: it is important 
that standardized processes protect the relationship between customers and aggregators, 
and govern bidirectional payment of sourcing costs as well as compensation between the 
BRPs (often the traditional suppliers) and the aggregators.312 In other words, it is crucial to put 
contracts in place between DSOs, load aggregators, and customers. It is vital that the right of 
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consumers to offer their flexibility on the market be acknowledged, while guarantees are put 
in place so that consumers maintain their rights when they sign up for demand response. 
There should be a provision for the network side to ensure some minimum balancing support 
through demand response schemes. Thus, demand response schemes could really contribute 
in reducing other capacity mechanisms. 
8. Provision of information to consumers: this relates not only to energy prices and how much 
customers could save by changing their consumption patterns, but also to other kinds of 
information. Consumers could feel more motivated to engage in demand response programs 
and choose among suppliers and aggregators depending on the mix of energy sources from 
which the electricity they consume is produced. Consumers could prefer a program and 
service provider that produces energy from cleaner sources, even if the monetary gains they 
could make were limited. 
9. Differences across consumers that could hinder their participation: in addition to different 
monetary incentives and regulatory frameworks primarily set at the national level, consumers 
within same countries could, de facto, find themselves facing different possibilities for joining 
demand response schemes. Just as in the case of the installation of micro-generation 
renewable plants (e.g., solar panels on the rooftop), it might be that consumers living, say, in 
a flat, rather than in a house with a garden, do not have the same possibility to engage in 
demand-side flexibility solutions. Hence, it might be appropriate for the relevant authorities 
at the national level and, if appropriate, also at the EU level, to consider how to create a more 
level playing field on the consumer side.  
 
10. Lack of financial incentives for consumers, especially through automatic adjustments within 
comfort levels: it is now well-known, especially thanks to studies from the discipline of 
economics, that the efforts of policymakers to empower consumers are often frustrated by 
the fact that consumers do not react to efforts to alter their consumption patterns.313 
Ironically, perhaps this is because they do not see the financial gain as sufficient reward for 
altering their consumption. Considering this difficulty, in addition to increasing financial 
incentives and promoting more cost-reflective tariffs that provide price signals for customers 
to adjust their consumption patterns, regulation could also consider providing fiscal 
incentives. Governments might consider putting in place policies that, through taxation, 
support demand-side adjustments. Another aspect that could be considered is a stronger use 
of “negative” financial incentives. These could manifest as increases in the penalties, rather 
than rewards for changing consumption patterns, which might be more effective than 
“positive” incentives. 
11. Automatization of demand response mechanisms: consumer participation in demand 
response programs should be made as easy as possible. In addition to concentrating on the 
rewards side of the equation, attention should be devoted also to the cost side. Consumers 
should have to invest as little time and effort as possible, so that they might engage in demand 
response even if the financial rewards are not very high in absolute terms. Automatization of 
responses appears to be crucial in this context. Consumers will not have to do anything, 
because adjustments in their consumption patterns will be automatic. The North American 
market is more experienced in the automatization of changes in consumption patterns within 
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customers’ “comfort zone.”314 For example, changes in the intensity of lighting within a flat 
that will not be noticed by its residents and will be activated automatically when appropriate. 
The US power markets are also more experienced with load aggregators. Hence it appears 
desirable to look at these experiences and learn from them. 
 
3.3. ELECTRICITY STORAGE AND ELECTRIC VEHICLES  
3.3.1. Background 
While solutions to the problem of large capacity energy storage are still in experimental stages of 
development,315 the importance of energy storage in future energy management systems cannot be 
underestimated. Current storage systems meet the temporary storage needs of small to medium-
scale generation, usually from RES. Despite the lack of technological advancement, energy storage is 
beneficial to all levels of the electricity market. First, they provide an option to redress the problem of 
the intermittence of RES generation.316 Further, the ability to store energy when prices are low and 
possibly sell when prices increase presents an opportunity for arbitrage.317  
However, the nearest term benefit is evident at the consumer level where it can contribute to the 
integration of decentralized production.318 This benefit is further augmented when EVs are integrated 
into a smart grid design. EVs have traditionally been lauded as climate-friendly alternatives to internal 
combustion engines, which emit greenhouse gases. However, more recently, the lithium-ion batteries 
used in EVs have been recognized as a potential storage device that can be used to provide reserve 
capacity to a grid, under what has come to be known as the Vehicle to Grid (V2G) system.319 Further, 
the integration of EV charging infrastructure with the appropriate management systems will allow the 
charging of EVs to become a controllable load. This would go a long way towards improving the 
reliability of the distributed power system,320 while ensuring that the EV is charged at the most 
convenient time. Despite the inability to store large volumes of electricity to meet traditional modes 
of supply in traditional electricity markets, current storage technology could play an important role in 
VPPs.  
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VPPs aggregate energy produced by diverse distributed generation sources, including small scale 
generators. Consequently, unused electricity stored in batteries from small scale RES could be fed-into 
a VPP. Similarly, energy stored in the lithium-ion321 batteries used in EVs could also be fed-into VPP or 
grids under the V2G system. 
There are predictions that electric vehicles will make up 14% of total car sales by 2025, up from 1% in 
2017.322 The Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries expects 266 million EVs to be on the 
street by 2040, up from 46 million.323 Regulations are tightening (which will be analyzed in the 
following sections) to the extent that the UK and France, among other European countries, have 
announced that all new cars must be zero-emission by 2050.324 If implemented in other jurisdictions 
beyond Europe, this sort of policy will have serious implications. For instance, in the US, around 85% 
of workers commute by car325 and around 65% of oil consumption comes from driving on roads.326 
China, which accounted for about 50% of the electric vehicles sold in 2016, aims at 2 million electric 
and plug-in hybrid cars on China’s roads by 2020 and 7 million by 2030.327 Most of the nearly 1 billion 
cars on the road today are powered by fossil fuels.328 Moreover, existing electric cars reduce CO2 
emissions by 54% compared with petrol-powered cars.329 
In addition to the high price, two major concerns seem to arise for electric car buyers: where can one 
charge an electric car and how long will it take? Currently, over 90% of charging is done at home.330 
However, in the US, public EV charging stations have been growing steadily since 2011.331 Carmakers 
such as Mercedes, BMW, Volkswagen, and Ford have said that they will together install a total of 400 
public charging points in Europe, which will deliver 350KW.332 In Europe, countries such as Germany, 
France, the Netherlands, and Norway are committed to improving access to public charging.333 In 
2017, China is installing 800,000 public charging points, including semi-public charging points for taxis 
and commercial vehicles at workplaces.334 The owner of a small electric car can have its battery 
charged in eight hours with a standard residential electricity supply and a 3.5KW charger.335 An 
acceptable solution to these two concerns is crucial for the EV revolution to take off. 
 
3.3.2. The EU legal basis 
The legal framework governing electricity storage in Europe is provided at the EU level by the Third 
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Energy Package.336 At the same time, laws are under development at the national level that will 
regulate electricity storage applications.337 
It is important to note that Directive 2009/72/EC338 does not expressly mention energy storage. 
However, the proposal for a new directive on common rules for the internal electricity market of 
February 2017 does regulate energy storage. The text of the proposal clarifies that DSOs should not 
be allowed, directly or indirectly, to own storage facilities.339 
In respect of EVs, the EU has set for itself an ambitious target of reducing the use of internal 
combustion engine vehicles by 50% by 2030 and phasing them out entirely by 2050 as part of efforts 
to reduce GHG Emissions.340 The alternative fuels directive341 encourages Member States to develop 
systems that enable EVs to feed power back into the grid. In addition, the Commission has recently 
published a strategy for low-emission mobility, which seeks to promote the removal of obstacles to 
the scaling up of the use of EVs.342 
 
3.3.3. Current status in Europe 
After conducting an overview of the distinct electricity storage technologies used in Europe at the end 
of 2012 and their expected increase in the ensuing five years, the CEER memo on development and 
regulation of electricity storage applications concluded that hydro-pumping storage is currently the 
most commonly used electricity storage technology.343 This picture is not expected to change 
considerably in the next several years. Although other technologies will be employed (e.g., flywheels, 
compressed air electricity storage, and electrochemical storage), they will still represent less than 3% 
of installed power.344 Even if they increase in number of applications, the associated growth in energy 
capacity will be minor. It is expected that electrochemical storage will increase by up to 100MW thanks 
to new demonstration projects.345 However, this stands in contrast with hydro-pumped storage, which 
represents about 37GW in storage capacity in the CEER member states.346 Of course, the situation 
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might change, even dramatically, thanks to breakthrough technologies.347 
The regulation of storage assets faces many conceptual and practical challenges. Conceptually, there 
is no consensus on the definition of storage assets. The question of whether they should be treated 
as generation assets or consumption units is particularly unresolved. This lack of clarity stems from 
the fact that, while storage assets can generate electricity in the literal sense of “generation,” the 
amount of electricity generated is typically not enough to provide a net positive flow to the electricity 
system.348 On the other hand, they cannot be properly classified as consumption units because they 
do not actually consume the energy that they take up. Could they also be classified as part of a 
transmission or distribution network, given that they can be a bridge asset between generators and 
final consumers? The answers to these questions is fundamental to the development of an 
appropriate regulatory regime because they impact, inter alia, ownership, pricing, and the imposition 
of taxes and levies.  
Regarding issues of ownership, the CEER memo shows that in most European countries, storage 
applications are owned by generators even though, in some countries, network operators may, to a 
certain degree, own storage applications.349 In most European countries, storage can provide services 
to both network operators and generators and its primary users are owners.350 The ownership of 
storage assets is one of the challenges that impinges the development of appropriate regulation. 
While there is no doubt that market operators such as TSO would benefit from owning storage assets, 
their unique position in the market presents an information asymmetry which would operate unfairly 
to their advantage against other market players. This is particularly true if stored energy is 
participating in the balancing and ancillary markets. It is in response to this problem that current 
proposals for the Electricity Directive seek to proscribe the ownership of storage assets by the owners 
or operators of network infrastructure.351 The proposed proscription is in keeping with the EU’s 
unbundling policy as a bid to prevent counter-competitive activity in electricity markets. 
In Spain, although there is no general regulatory framework for electricity storage, there are hydro-
pumped storage power plants that perform the function of providing power during hours of peak 
consumption.352 The only exception relates to regulation of storage for small self-consumption 
systems. Under the Electricity Sector Law 24/2013, battery owners do not only have to pay an 
additional tax, but are also not allowed to reduce the maximum power they have under contract with 
their supplier.353 While it may be argued that this is intended to maintain grid integrity, when coupled 
with the high self-consumption tax, the regulatory regime for self-consumption and storage appears 
to be ill-considered.   
In some cases, the regulatory framework not only does not promote, but actually hinders the 
development of storage. For example, in some countries, taxation is not favorable to storage, as 
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typified by the “Grid Fee System.”354 Ordinarily, grid fees are paid by the final consumers of power as 
a fee for the transportation of electricity through the grid network.355 In the case of storage, operators 
of storage assets are first charged for charging the storage asset. The operators are then also charged 
for discharging it because of the notional double flow of electricity. In real terms, the storage asset is 
neither a producer nor consumer. Therefore, the strict application of the traditional grid fee model 
should not extend to storage assets. Often, this double taxation is higher than power prices and results 
in a very strong disincentivization of electricity storage.356  
Regarding EVs, the European Environment Agency reports that in 2015, 150,000 new EVs were sold in 
the EU. However, 90% of these sales were in the Netherlands, the UK, Germany, France, Sweden, and 
Denmark.357 Despite a steady growth in the number of EVs sold in the EU over the years, the 2015 
numbers represent only 1.2% of total vehicle sales. Figure 2 shows the trend of EV sales since 2010.  
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Figure 2 – EV Sales in the EU 
Source: European Environment Agency, Electric Vehicles in Europe (EEA Report, 2016), p. 49 
Note: * In 2010, 2011, and 2012, only statistics for battery electric vehicles are available. ** The 
data for 2015 are provisional. 
 
In countries such as Norway and the Netherlands, where EV sales are very high, regulatory incentives 
have played a large role in promoting consumer interest.358 These incentives include tax exemptions 
on EV purchases, one-off grants, and the imposition of taxes on fossil fuels. Figure 3 summarizes the 
use of incentives for EVs across Europe. In Belgium, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, and the Netherlands, 
there is a full registration tax exemption on EV Purchases, while Denmark and Finland provide a partial 
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exemption.359 Other financial schemes employed by governments are fixed grants, as employed in 
France and Portugal for replacing an end-of-life vehicle with a new electric vehicle.  
Beyond promoting consumer interest, many countries also support research and development with a 
view to promoting innovation in the EV sector. Finland, for instance, instituted the Electric Vehicles 
Systems Programme in 2011 with a budget of EUR 100 million to support the growth of the EV 
sector.360  
Governments have also taken various actions to support the development of infrastructure, 
particularly charging points. France, for instance, set up a special fund, for the construction of charging 
infrastructure, which led to the construction of 5,000 charging points in 2015.361 In Sweden, individuals 
who installed charging points in their homes obtained a tax reduction for the associated labor cost.362 
However, an emerging barrier to the large-scale deployment of charging infrastructure is that new, 
fast charging technology is not only expensive to install, but also requires high voltage input. The 
associated consumption fee is therefore high.363  
Non-financial measures, particularly at the local government level, have also been instrumental 
towards the promotion of EVs in Europe. In the UK, for instance, some local councils have adopted a 
procurement policy that requires at least one EV amongst their fleet of vehicles.364 In Bulgaria, the 
National Action Plan for the promotion of EVs gave EVs free parking in all its cities.365 In other countries 
like Spain and Norway, road toll exemptions and discounts apply to EVs.366 
As national responses to climate change and air pollution continue to increase in response to EU 
Directives, it is expected that many more countries will adopt policies that would enhance EVs and 
storage technology. 
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Figure 3 – Use of incentives for EVs across Europe 
Source: European Environment Agency, Electric Vehicles in Europe (EEA Report, 2016), 65 
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3.3.4. Towards regulatory policy recommendations 
Given the importance of unbundling of energy suppliers under the Third Energy Package, a definition 
of storage is necessary. Particularly, a clear delineation of which operators in the market can own, 
operate, or control these assets. 
Regulatory intervention would also be required to incentivize investment in the development of 
storage technologies. In the case of prosumers, given that they arguably contend with a double 
economic hurdle typified by the high cost of storage technology as well as uncertain and sometimes 
unfavorable market structures for self-generated electricity, the need for investment incentives must 
be coupled with favorable policies related to demand response mechanisms and self-
generation/consumption of renewables. Ultimately, the impact of storage on electricity markets 
hinges largely on the economics of storage solutions. Therefore, the institution of appropriate 
regulatory incentives is critical to ensuring the desired level of storage solutions. 
A review of grid fees structure is also necessary to avoid situations where storage assets pay double 
grid fees. Better consideration should be given to the kind of service provided by storage assets in 
determining the applicability or otherwise of grid fees or other similar taxes. In the grander scheme of 
facilitating the development of smart grids and electricity markets, the regulatory framework should 
not discriminate between DERs, thereby ensuring that storage resources are granted equal access to 
flexibility markets to enable them to compete equally with fossil-fuel based generation units.  
Policy-makers should create incentives for consumers and companies to use EVs, in addition to the 
construction and operation of electric vehicle charging facilities. Such incentives might include lower 
taxes for EVs, higher taxes for vehicles using gasoline, the possibility for EVs to use exclusive taxi or 
bus lanes, and support for research and development activities. 
There are potential concerns. One is how realistic it is to expect states under financial and budgetary 
distress to pursue measures such as those enumerated above. Another is whether pursuing such 
measures could go against the State aid regime at the EU level. A further issue is under what conditions 
these support measures could be accepted and/or whether it would be desirable to amend the current 
State aid regime (e.g., through State aid guidelines that the Commission regularly produces over time 
across domains). 
It is also worth noting that the increase in the use of EVs will contribute to the increase in demand for 
electricity. The IEA research scenarios estimate that the transport sector will make up 10% of total 
electricity consumption by 2050, owing largely to the increase in EV and plug-in electric vehicle  use.367 
Therefore, it is critical that EV deployment is done as part of a larger smart grids strategy to ensure 
strategic low-cost vehicle charging. 
                                                            
367 International Energy Agency (IEA), “Technology Roadmap; Smart Grids,” OECD/IEA, France, p. 12, 2011. 
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4. SOCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND ETHICAL ISSUES OF SMART GRIDS  
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this section, the development of smart grids will be analyzed regarding its implications for social 
and ethical matters. This section draws primarily on the EU context, although it has its conceptual 
background in international law and policy. Indeed, the ethical framework is founded on international 
human rights law as incorporated into the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
The primary aim of considering the ethical framework when dealing with the development of smart 
grids is to ensure that smart grids contribute to the further realization of economic and social rights 
within a period of transition to a low-carbon society. Society needs to be engaged and should benefit 
from the technological transformations occurring in energy generation and consumption. This paper 
highlights opportunities and potential downsides of the path towards the achievement of such goals.  
In section 4.2, the article focuses on how smart grids can contribute to a broader economic 
transformation. It considers the economic transition occurring globally towards collaborative 
economics and how the EU aims to incorporate new market exchange models into smart grids energy 
systems. The section considers the potential social and environmental benefits in addition to the 
challenges that lie ahead in realizing policy goals about the future.   
Section 4.3 explores how the EU is working towards fostering more flexible, open, transparent, and 
dynamic policies within the energy sector. To achieve a low-carbon sustainable society that is fair and 
equitable for all, the new model also has to reduce the use of resources and to use them efficiently. 
The section also outlines the importance of new concepts in the management of resources, such as 
circular economy, which aims at closing the loop on waste and inefficiency throughout whole product 
lifecycles, including the design phase.  
In section 4.4, the article takes up issues relating to ICT and smart grids. The first two sections give an 
overview of the key issues raised by the integration of ICT into energy systems and address the 
cybersecurity and privacy issues of smart grids. The final section considers international and EU legal 
responses to those issues, focusing on privacy and data protection, and Digital Systems Security. 
4.2. SMART GRIDS: CONTRIBUTING TO THE EU COLLABORATIVE ECONOMY    
The introduction of smart grids into the EU energy grid heralds a crucial transformation. The EU is in 
the process of investing in radical reform of the economic foundations upon which it depends. The 
strategic decisions that the EU adopts are driven by many interconnected factors and the main 
difficulties seem to be found not much within the technical aspects, but more within the policy-
related, social, or regulatory issues.368 
 
The approach to the transition to a low-carbon economy that the European Commission has embraced 
is based on new, flexible, dynamic, digital, and resource-efficient economic models.369 This will 
increase the reuse of materials to add value to each product’s life-cycle and reduce dependency on 
sourcing natural resources externally. Such a moment of transition could be a substantial opportunity 
to overcome existing inequalities throughout the EU Member States while the EU economy continues 
to recover from the 2008 economic crisis.370  
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This section highlights the interlinkages between the different policy and governance approaches to 
sustainable development371 and resource efficiency within a collaborative economy. It considers such 
approaches to emphasize the role that smart grids could play towards achieving the EU’s policy goals. 
 
An introduction to the concept of the collaborative economy will be provided in section 4.2.1. Section 
4.2.2 focuses on the EU context, while section 4.2.3 specifically links the potential of a collaborative 
economy with a smart grids energy system. The final section focuses specifically on energy poverty, 
as an example of the social benefits that the collaborative economy can provide. 
4.2.1. The Collaborative Economy: A “Disruptive Innovation”  
The collaborative economy has become a major phenomenon in recent years due to increased 
business opportunities made possible by advances in digital ICT.372 The digital economy has opened 
up new innovative ways for people to engage in the market exchange of goods and services that 
circumvent existing institutional economic structures.373 The collaborative economy provides the 
opportunity for individuals and/or communities to offer their assets, time, and skills within the digital 
market place.374 This is particularly relevant to those looking to develop market mechanisms to tap 
into low-carbon energy generation and distribution from decentralized energy communities.375 
The collaborative economy is a phenomenon that can profoundly change the way consumers buy or 
rent goods and services. It can also allow consumers to enter the market to provide goods, services, 
time, or skills themselves and become prosumers. Within such business models, the traditional 
business-to-consumer relationship is no longer the norm. A trilateral relationship is created instead: 
the consumer, the provider of a service or good, and the intermediary platform, with anyone being 
one or more of these actors.376 The collaborative economy business models, unlike traditional 
markets, are based on relationships of trust, reputation, and reviews systems. 
The advent of the collaborative economy, also referred to as the sharing economy, is what economists 
call a “disruptive innovation” while some even talk of it being, alongside the digital economy, “the 
fourth industrial revolution.”377 The concept of sharing goods and services is not without historical 
precedence. What differentiates traditional collaborative economic activities with the proper 
collaborative economy is that the sharing/collaborative model “has progressed from a community 
practice into a profitable business model.”378 The concept has a certain dynamism that fits within the 
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advent of artificial intelligence, big data, and 3D printing.379 The collaborative economy represents a 
big change from traditional markets by bringing operators to modernize their offer and business 
models. This competition is generally good for consumers.380 It can indeed make consumer markets 
more efficient, as it brings down transaction costs and is able to offer cheaper products and services.  
As the phenomenon penetrates more into people’s everyday lives, it is important that appropriate 
regulatory frameworks are adopted in order to provide essential services, such as energy. This must 
be done in such a way that the dynamism and flexibility of the exchanges between new small-scale 
enterprises providing services is not undermined. The collaborative economy offers many benefits to 
consumers and prosumers. But it also presents risks. Advantages and disadvantages of the collective 
economy will be analyzed in the following sub-section, which focuses on the European context. 
4.2.2. The EU and the Collaborative Economy 
Assisting consumers, businesses, and public authorities to participate and contribute to the success of 
a collaborative economy is central to the future economic strategy of the EU and the EU sees the 
collaborative economy as a new opportunity.381 Commission Vice-President Jyrki Katainen even stated 
that “Europe's next unicorn could stem from the collaborative economy,” stressing the innovative 
potential that might be revealed through the collaborative economy in the area of products or 
services.382 When considering such a new business model, the EU is also aware of the scale of 
challenges faced by the delivery of such benefits.383 The new economic model should happen without 
undermining existing consumer and employment rights, alongside other regulations on health, safety, 
and the environment. The European Commission cautions that a “fragmented approach to new 
business models creates uncertainty for traditional operators, new services providers, and consumers 
alike and may hamper innovation, job creation, and growth.”384 
The implications of the sharing economy for law, regulation, and policy-making are only beginning to 
be considered.385 The European Commission, national competition authorities, and consumer 
protection regulators in Europe are currently in the process of formulating their regulatory approach 
to address some idiosyncratic issues raised by the sharing economy. When adopting the Single Market 
Strategy in 2015, the European Commission announced that it "will develop a European agenda for 
the collaborative economy, including guidance on how existing EU law applies to collaborative 
economy business models."386 Currently, the non-regulatory approach followed by the EU relies on 
many pre-existing legal concepts. These concepts are often ill-adapted to this new model of doing 
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business, thus bearing the risk of extreme fragmentation along national lines.387 This will frustrate 
efforts to incorporate the collaborative economy into the updated Single Market Strategy, 388 including 
the European Energy Union.389 
The collaborative economy’s expansion and success is intrinsically linked with new technologies. Cloud 
computing390 facilities are considered integral by the European Commission for creating new 
opportunities to foster innovative business models, including the collective economy, because many 
new innovations depend on access to data at reduced costs.391 Special Rapporteur Hans Graux notes 
that “small businesses in particular can benefit from the cloud, as they can gain access to high-
performance IT solutions, which will help them to adapt quickly to new market developments and to 
innovate and grow their businesses faster.”392 Given this perspective, the cloud has an enormous role 
to play in delivering decentralized energy provisions in the EU energy generation. It will open up 
opportunities for new small- and medium-scale actors to manage data from wireless and internet 
applications that increasingly constitute smart grids. 
4.2.3. Smart Grids: A Platform for the Collaborative Economy 
Smart grids are “an integrated system that includes technologies, information (availability, 
accessibility, utility), human and social influences, organizational and managerial supporting 
arrangements, and political (policy) constraints as well as facilitation considerations.”393 Smart 
metering systems are one stepping stone towards smart grids, empowering consumers to actively 
participate in the energy market. Under Directive 2009/72/EC and Directive 2009/73/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, EU Member States are required to “ensure the 
implementation of intelligent metering systems to assist the active participation of consumers in the 
electricity and gas supply markets.”394 It is also an initiative to increase the number of energy providers 
within the European Energy Union Strategy.395 
The European Commission explicitly acknowledged its Energy Union as a strategy “with citizens at its 
core, where they take ownership of the energy transition, benefit from new technologies to  reduce  
their  bills,  participate  actively  in  the  market,  and  where  vulnerable consumers are protected.”396 
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Local energy consumers are crucial to delivering a new power market design that enables consumers 
to participate in the market through demand-side response, auto-production, smart metering, and 
storage. In the Winter Package proposed by the European Commission in 2016, EU Member States are 
required to provide an enabling regulatory framework for local energy communities and users.397  
With the appropriate regulatory and legal frameworks to incentivize the participation of consumers, 
the energy economy has the potential to switch from a traditional supply-side driven system 
controlled by energy cartels into a demand-led decentralized model that fosters competition from 
localized providers.398 This potentially opens economic and societal space for the emergence of the 
energy prosumer at a level that is truly transformative. Political priority will need to support 
decentralization, countering decades of investment of political capital—and the requisite legal 
infrastructure—for large-scale energy business, including national companies. This demonstrates that 
decentralization can deliver secure, affordable, and sustainable energy supplies and could potentially 
provide the necessary persuasion to governments and citizens alike to embrace new energy systems. 
4.2.4. Delivering Social Benefits in a Collaborative Economy 
The relationship between new technologies and social change is at the core of the energy/climate 
debate.399 There is an overwhelming belief that informed individuals will make rational choices that 
will benefit society and the environment. Nonetheless, the embedding of new technologies within 
society can have unforeseen consequences. It is very interesting to consider the unplanned 
consequences, and perhaps even the distorted incentives, that the upscaled adoption of new 
technologies into the very structure of society and our economy can have. There is a need to question 
the “smart utopia” being offered.400  
 
One goal underpinning energy reforms is to address energy poverty across Europe. On average, 
11%—over 54 million—of EU citizens experienced some form of energy poverty (being unable to 
keep homes at ambient temperatures, having difficulty with bill payments and/or living with 
inadequate energy infrastructure services).401 The situation is especially pervasive in Central Eastern 
and Southern European Member States.402  
In addition to the cost in economic terms, the negative social and environmental impacts of energy 
poverty severely curtail the quality of life of vulnerable individuals and communities. Despite this, only 
a few EU countries have adopted legal definitions recognizing energy poverty.403 The causes of energy 
poverty are multiple. A key issue is the structure of energy markets, which impacts energy pricing and 
determines, to some level, incentives for more efficient energy use. Investments in upgrading and 
incorporating modern digital ICT into the energy system need to tackle energy poverty at the forefront 
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of their ambitions. 
The potential of smart grids to contribute to addressing energy poverty in the EU will be determined 
by key policy and regulatory decisions. Policy design needs to take account of the interconnections 
with other related strategies being pursued by the EU. The Digital Single Market Strategy is central to 
smart grids’ achieving economic value. Such a strategy focuses on maximizing the growth of Digital 
Economy potential by boosting competitiveness.404 It is clear that ICT is already leading to new 
business models—as part of the new collaborative economy—and there is great speculation that, with 
the appropriate regulation, such new models could facilitate a more social just and equitable economy 
within Europe, and globally.405 Nonetheless, whether these models can actually play a role in tackling 
some of the energy poverty issues remains to be seen. 
To determine how best to ensure energy poverty is addressed, a distinction needs to be made 
between traditional consumers and those who are active service providers in the collaborative 
economy. The demographic affected by energy poverty and new service providers within the 
collaborative economy are by no means aligned. Energy poverty occurs largely in marginalized, 
vulnerable, and poorer communities, often in rural areas and small towns.406 The actors driving the 
collaborative economy tend to be from urban and affluent communities.407 Individually, the profiles 
also differ from that those who are active in forming and benefitting from the opportunities of the 
collaborative economy come from well-educated, younger, and technologically literate cohorts of the 
population.408 However, it is argued that the collaborative economy opens up opportunities to young 
marginalized communities, who can enter the business sector without the need to meet professional 
cultural standards.409 There are also concerns that transnational corporate players within the 
collaborative economy could appropriate emergent micro-entrepreneurs. Such companies have 
actively sought to lobby the law-making process within the EU. In a 2016 open letter to the 
Netherlands Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 47 commercial sharing platforms, 
including Uber and Airbnb, urged the EU Member States to “ensure that local and national laws do 
not unnecessarily limit the development of the collaborative economy to the detriment of Europeans” 
by citing the benefits stemming from sharing services.410 It is integral that “benefits” are understood 
to be social ones and not just “commercial” benefits. For the collaborative economy to be socially 
sustainable, these benefits need to be available not just to those who can become market providers, 
but also to service users.411   
The collaborative economy as a fluid, flexible organizing market, will not per se result in affordable 
energy pricing targeting those most in need.412 However, it can deliver opportunities in terms of 
efficiency and affordability to consumers. Such potential depends on the structure of the energy 
market. Decentralization to increase competition, although part of the EU energy reform packages, 
has resulted in limiting competition even amongst large-scale providers. The goal under EU energy 
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strategies to increase energy cooperatives that can deliver energy locally with the greatest efficiencies 
requires clear policy incentives. This will need government intervention to ensure that social 
opportunities are realized. Delivering social and environmental benefits to all must be at the core of 
the pathways to achieve a low-carbon energy transition. The next section considers how the EU is 
approaching the challenges. 
4.3. LOW-CARBON TRANSITION PATHWAYS AND SMART GRIDS  
4.3.1. Conceptualizing issues 
The adoption of smart grids can have a vast positive impact on EU policy on energy and climate. The 
2015 Paris Agreement has provided a significant boost to deliver the policies agreed by the EU 
countries on energy and climate.413 The Agreement is a global driver of investment in technology, law, 
and policy to achieve a low-carbon world. The potential pathways to achieve this energy transition are 
many but principles of justice, equity, and fairness should inspire the whole approach to the change. 
The United Nations (UN) Paris Agreement’s stated goal for the maximum increase of the global 
average temperature is between 2°C and 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.414 A warming of 2°C will 
result in a new climate regime, particularly in tropical regions, whilst 1.5°C of warming will bring the 
Earth to a climate at the outer edge of historical experience for human civilization.415 The risks 
associated with the rising global temperature are driving action that will have political, economic, 
environmental, and social impacts.416 Either temperature outcome under the Paris Agreement will 
have impacts on existing energy systems, especially the infrastructure for generation and 
distribution.417 Both the 2°C and 1.5°C targets are likely to be missed. Maintaining security and 
resilience requires engineers, policy-makers, and regulators to create climate-proofed energy systems 
as part of the process towards a low-carbon new model.  
The EU has recognized the scale of the task. The EU’s Sixth Environmental Action Programme (EAP) 
identified climate change as the “outstanding challenge of the next 10 years and beyond.”418 It has 
deliberately interlinked climate change policy with energy policy to develop pathways towards a low-
carbon economy.419 To encourage the transition to a more secure, affordable, and decarbonized 
energy system,420 the EU adopted climate and energy targets to be achieved in the coming decades. 
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In 2007, the “Europe 2020 Strategy” set three key targets: 20% cut in GHG emissions (from 1990 
levels), 20% of EU energy from renewables, and 20% improvement in energy efficiency.421 In 2014, the 
EU set the target to reduce GHG emissions by at least 40% by 2030 from 1990 levels.422 The EU also 
adopted a long-term goal aiming at reducing EU greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% below 1990 
levels by 2050.423 In February 2015, the Energy Union Strategy was launched, with the goal of leading 
to a sustainable, low-carbon, and environmentally friendly economy.424  
Despite such ambitious targets, the link between energy and climate-related issues is relatively new 
within the EU. Although energy issues have always been at the heart of European integration, energy-
related topics (such as climate change policy, renewable energy, energy planning, and energy security 
of supply) have only gained in importance to the EU's policy and regulation agenda since the concept 
of sustainability increased in importance at the European and international425 level.426 Such a different 
approach has resulted in considering the three dimensions of sustainability (economic, environmental, 
and social) within any EU policy. It is encouraging that energy and environmental regulation are now 
clearly understood to be two sides of the same coin, whereas previously they were perceived as 
separate competences.427 Developing strategies to achieve both climate and energy targets will 
require effective institutional management and good multilevel governance involving existing and 
new actors. A new transitional approach will help to achieve such a goal from an institutional point of 
view. 
Until quite recently, the concept of transitional justice has been associated only with post-conflict 
truth and reconciliation processes.428 However, an increasing number of justice scholars are seeing 
the value of applying the concept to other political and legal developments related to human rights, 
including natural resources management and climate change law.429 A multidisciplinary approach to 
exploring the discourse and practice of transitional strategies within EU climate and energy policy can 
offer a conceptual foundation for understanding the justice dimension of the dynamic normative 
transition within other jurisdictions and contexts. A transitional justice approach to the transformation 
from a carbon-dominant energy system to one based on smart grids and renewables could offer the 
EU a methodological pathway that will help address pressing social issues such as energy poverty. This 
approach already exists in varying degrees in all European countries, as discussed in section 4.2.4.  
It is evident that the EU is seeking to undertake a transformation towards a low-carbon economy that 
                                                            
421 Communication from the Commission, “A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” COM(2010) 2020 final. 
422 Conclusions on 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework, SN79/14 (23 October 2014). 
423 Communication from the Commission to the European Commission, Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Energy Roadmap 2050,” COM(2011) 885 final (15 December 2011). 
N. Fujiwara, “Overview of the EU climate policy based on the 2030 framework,” in Delivering Energy Law and Policy in the 
EU and the US, R. Heffron and G. Little, Eds., Edinburgh University Press, 2016, pp. 605-609. 
424 Communication from the Commission "Unleashing the Potential of Cloud Computing in Europe", COM(2012)529 final. 
425 Indeed, at the international level, a relatively new initiative called the International Solar Alliance, launched 
by India’s Prime Minister Modi and France’s President Francoise Hollande, is very promising as a mechanism to 
mitigate climate change. It is expected to channel $300 billion in 10 years for the promotion of renewable energy 
projects. See T. Mishra, “Sun shines on $300-billion global fund for clean energy,” The Hindu Business Line, 1 
May 2017, available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/sun-shines-on-300billion-global-fund-
for-clean-energy/article9675599.ece. 
426 I. Solorio et al., “The European Energy Policy and its green dimension – discursive hegemony and policy variations in the 
greening of energy policy,” in Sustainable Development and Governance in Europe, P. Barnes and T. Hoerber, Eds., Routledge, 
2013. 
427 E. Orlando, “The Evolution of EU Policy and Law in the Environmental Field: Achievements and Current Challenges,” in 
The EU, the US and Global Climate Governance (Hardback) book cover, C. Bakker and F. Francioni, Eds., Routledge, 2014, p. 
74. 
428 N. Roht-Arriaza and J. Mariezcurrena, Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century Beyond Truth versus Justice, 
Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
429 R. Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice: Contemporary Essays, Oxford University Press, 2014; H. Franzki and M. Olarte, 
“Understanding the political economy of transitional justice: A critical theory perspective,” in Transitional Justice Theories, 
S. Buckley-Ziste, T. Beck, C. Braun and F. Mieth, Eds., Routledge, 2014, pp. 201-218. 
 63 
can meet these challenges. The EU is increasingly seeking to include such principles within those laws 
and policies that aim at achieving resilient economic, social, and environmental systems.430 The 
intersection of social, economic, environmental, and political rights across all communities of energy 
users, including marginalized and vulnerable groups, needs to be explored as part of a more 
interconnected examination of each of the EU’s actions, especially considering its leading position of 
addressing environmental issues adopting a more inclusive, holistic and integrated approach.431 
The Fifth EAP (1993) was a reaction to the perceived failure of regulatory measures to achieve 
environmental goals. The Fifth EAP abandoned the traditional “command-and-control” approach in 
favor of innovative regulatory models that implied “shared responsibility between various actors: 
government, industry, and the public.”432 The EU welcomed the principle of sustainable development, 
combining economic, social, and environmental aspects in 1997 when EU Member States adopted the 
Amsterdam Treaty.433 This is now incorporated in Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
and it can be considered a “constitutional objective” of the EU.434 In 2001, the European Council 
adopted the EU Sustainable Development Strategy, “a long-term strategy dovetailing policies for 
economically, socially, and ecologically sustainable development.”435 After this important step, the 
Sixth EAP (2002) advocated “a more inclusive approach including more specific targets and an 
increased use of market-based measures.”436 This aims at strengthening the integration of 
environmental concerns into other policies, in an attempt to foster greater engagement and 
implementation by EU Member States.437 The most recent EAP, the Seventh EAP (2013),438 emphasizes 
decoupling economic growth from carbon emissions and establishing a circular economy.439 To 
achieve its goals, the Seventh EAP commits to a better integration of environmental concerns into 
other policy areas and ensures coherence when creating new policy. Strategic initiatives feeding into 
the Seventh EAP include the Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe440 and the Roadmap for a low 
carbon economy by 2050.441 
                                                            
430 ClientEarth, “Sustainable Development as a Key Policy Objective of the European Union”, Identifying Opportunities for 
Sustainable Public Procurement, Briefing Series Briefing No.1, October 2011. 
431 Ibid. 
432 European Commission, “"Towards Sustainability" the European Community Programme of policy and action in relation to 
the environment and sustainable development,” [Online]. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/action-
programme/5th.htm. [Accessed 15 February 2017]. 
433 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and 
Certain Related Acts, Amsterdam, 2 October 1997, [On-line]. Available: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf [Accessed 05 September 2017]. 
434 The objective of sustainable development can be found in the Constitutions of other jurisdictions (such as South Africa), 
but the European Union as a supranational region is the only one that refers to such objective for more than one country. 
Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides that “The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work 
for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive 
social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of 
the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance”. Also, according to Article 3(5) TEU, 
the EU shall contribute to ‘the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and 
fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights.’ 
435 European Commission, “Strategy for sustainable development”, [Online]. Available: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:l28117&from=EN. [Accessed 15 February 2017]. 
436 European Commission, “Environment 2010: Our Future, Our Choice. 6th EU Environment Action Programme”, European 
Commission, 2001, [On-line]. Available http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/pdf/6eapbooklet_en.pdf [Accessed 07 
September 2017]. 
437 Ibid. 
438 Decision No 1386/2013/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 20 November 2013 on a General 
Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, within the limits of our planet’. 
439 European Commission, “Environment Action Programme to 2020”, [Online]. Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/action-programme/. [Accessed 15 February 2017]. 
440 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe” COM(2011) 571 final.  
441 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050”, 
COM(2011) 112 final. 
 64 
The EU Climate and Energy Package focuses on the fact that some contradictions can arise between 
the instruments to reduce GHG emissions and the protection of the environment. Although the EU is 
still not sure whether the package succeeds in balancing climate change mitigation with other 
environmental protection goals, it succeeds in supporting climate change mainstreaming.442 The EU's 
climate policy and leadership on sustainability governance contrasts with the complexities of the 
internal energy market. Sustainability governance is still rather underdeveloped,443 despite the 
overuse of the term “sustainability” in a significant number of legal instruments advocating for it.444 
Meeting renewable energy demands in a low-carbon economy will need to be done in a manner that 
does not result in negative impacts on the environment.445  
The EU, as a governance body, continues to invest in advancing innovative approaches to policy-
making in its pursuit of realizing sustainable development.446 In the 1990s, Collier observed that 
environmental policy integration is necessary for “achieving sustainable development and preventing 
environmental damage; removing contradictions between policies as well as within policies, and 
realizing mutual benefits and the goal of making policies mutually supportive.”447 Given today's 
challenges of energy security of supply, climate change, biodiversity conservation, and the need for 
an equitable allocation of resources, sustainable development is perceived as a new constitutional 
paradigm, and is now even more essential to the EU’s regulatory frameworks than when the concept 
was coined in 1987.448 The adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals449 by the international 
community at the UN General Assembly in September 2015 provided the EU with an opportunity to 
push forward the key principles of the TFEU and incorporate them into the very fabric of policy-
making, both substantively and procedurally.450  
As part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,451 the EU is keen to reform its policy-making 
approach to ensure that it considers long-term impacts. In measuring progress towards sustainable 
transitions and human well-being within the physical limits of the planet, it is necessary to assess 
environmental sustainability. The so-called “planetary boundaries”452 for carbon emissions, water use, 
and land use are being modelled to determine the ecological space available for sustainable 
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development. “Growing scientific evidence for the indispensable role of environmental sustainability 
in sustainable development calls for appropriate frameworks and indicators for environmental 
sustainability assessment.”453 Most decision-support systems and recommendations developed to 
analyze trade-offs between low-carbon energy generation and other interests have focused on single 
energy sources such as biomass, wind energy, and hydropower. A way to represent the pressure that 
humanity exerts on the Earth’s ecosystems is to measure humanity’s environmental footprint.454 
Recently, a growing list of such footprints has been created such as the ecological footprint, the carbon 
footprint, and the water footprint.455 The anthropogenic impact on the planet needs to be taken up 
by policy-makers, economists, and lawyers when designing long-term strategies for pathways to a low-
carbon world, including those working on smart grids energy systems. 
The concept of building resilience into the system has increasingly complemented the debate on 
sustainability456 and has focused on long-term solutions. The European Environmental Agency has 
called for: 
increased use of foresight methods, such as horizon scanning, scenario development and 
visioning [which] could strengthen long-term decision-making by bringing together different 
perspectives and disciplines, and developing systemic understanding. Impact assessments of 
the European Commission and EU Member States, for example, could be enhanced if they 
were systematically required to consider the long-term global context.457  
Technologies can either undermine or enhance the resilience of systems.458 The energy/climate 
debate is one infused with a faith in the positive relationship between the introduction of new 
technologies and social change.459  
It is not only the technological system, but also the social-ecological systems that need to be resilient 
to reduce the chances of exposure to shocks. “Social-ecological systems and socio-technical systems 
are understood to display complex, dynamic, multiscale, and adaptive properties; recommendations 
for their sustainable governance emphasize learning, experimentation, and iteration.”460 The 
transition phase is one where multiple pathways are being pursued and the social-ecological 
ecosystem is at its most dynamic and vulnerable stage.461  
Research into the slow uptake of smart grids has emphasized the importance of developing a diverse 
approach and establishing multiple pathways for transformation amongst all stakeholders to build 
resilience within the system.462 There is a need for flexible, responsive regulatory frameworks that are 
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fit for a transformational social-economic system. This requires lawyers and policy-makers to 
recognize uncertainties within systems—in this case smart grid-based energy systems—and adopt a 
more adaptive approach to governance, which takes our incomplete knowledge of social-ecological 
systems into account. 
The transition to a low-carbon world will need the EU Member States and others to carefully balance 
the new opportunities arising from ICT alongside societal and environmental needs in a just, fair, and 
equitable manner. The Member States must focus on delivering integrated sustainable outcomes 
across all sectors. One area where this is most necessary is the use and disposal of resources.  
4.3.2. Smart Grids within a Circular Economy  
One threat to EU economic security and growth is access to raw materials. Increasing energy efficiency 
is part of a broader goal to increase resource efficiency in the EU.463 One strategy is to develop a 
circular economy. This section outlines the concept and the reasons why it is needed, especially in 
relation to smart grids. The discussion covers themes of design obsolescence, extended product 
responsibility, and e-waste management. This section considers how responsibilities should be 
allocated during the life cycle and value chain of products in a decentralized digital energy system, and 
to whom. The life cycle assessment is a process used to evaluate the environmental burdens that come 
with a product, production process, or activity throughout its entire life cycle from the phase of raw 
material extraction to final disposal.464 
The transition to a low-carbon economy will not be without waste. It is imperative that forethought 
goes into business modelling and resource management for the entire lifecycle of the product to limit 
impacts on the environment and contribute to increasing energy efficiency. Today, much is wasted in 
three key resources: materials, food, and energy. Around 60% of energy in the US economy is 
wasted.465 About 40% of food produced in the US in never eaten.466 Up to 18% of water treated in the 
US is wasted.467 The situation is not much better in the rest of the world: around 33% of energy is 
lost.468 Between 30-50% of all food produced is wasted.469 Up to 60% of water is lost through leaky 
pipes worldwide.470 Researchers in Austria are currently studying the notion of socio-metabolism, 
which will help us describe and understand the transition to a new kind of society, namely the concept 
of a circular economy. In their words, “socio-economic systems depend on a continuous throughput 
of materials and energy for their reproduction and maintenance. This dependency can be seen as a 
functional equivalent of biological metabolism, the organism’s dependency on material and energy 
flows.”471 For instance, the metabolism of a city implies the transformation from raw materials, water, 
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and fuel into goods, human biomass, and waste. It has been defined as “the technical and 
socioeconomic processes that occur in cities, resulting in growth, production of energy, and 
elimination of waste.”472 The goal, therefore, is to move towards an industrial ecosystem, where “the 
consumption of energy and materials is optimized, waste generation is minimized, and the effluents 
from one process serve as the raw material for another.”473 
The global growth in renewable energy capacity will soon bring end-of-life cycle waste management 
issues to the fore. First, planning ahead is necessary to manage the existing waste stream from 
established renewables. Second, it is necessary to promote a circular closed-loop approach to the 
whole life-cycle of products and contribute to a green economy.474 Countries need to undertake 
reforms of existing laws and develop innovative policy and regulation to meet these challenges. The 
risks are high, primarily because renewable energy is far from being “clean.” 
 
The EU’s energy targets promote energy efficiency, renewable energy, and decentralization, but these 
goals also need to fit within the broader 2030 EU Agenda for Sustainable Development475 and the 
Circular Economy Action Plan to increase resource efficiency and decrease waste.476 Rising costs, 
driven by the growing demand for primary resources, including those needed for smart grid systems, 
requires new approaches to resource management along the entire life cycle value chain. The EU is 
increasingly recognizing that the current economic model dependent on the linear use of materials is 
no longer viable. This is the reason why closing the material loop is prioritized.477  
4.3.2.1. The Circular Economy Concept and the EU 
The circular economy, also known as a “closed loop” economy, aims to reach holistic sustainability 
goals and is based on the concept of “no waste.”478 It is related to the concept of dematerializing. 
Circular economy is part of the relatively new science of industrial ecology,479 which is critical to 
sustainable development. The concept of circular economy has the great advantage that, if you are 
re-using something, you do not need to go back to the extraction of natural resources and the 
production process when making a product.480 Instead, in a circular economy, the end-of-life stage of 
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products and materials must be replaced by restoration.481 In other words, it is about the notion of 
“cradle to cradle.”482 Even Mother Nature uses a circular-economy approach. Reducing waste is 
therefore at the core of the circular economy model.483 It is a concept that recognizes the continuous 
potential value of materials to reduce resource inefficiency in both production and consumption, 
showing thereby that efficiency is an important resource. This must be the objective of a profound 
transformation. Consequently, the standard approach to creation, fabrication, and commerce of 
products must change as well.  
The EU is heavily dependent on imported raw materials, especially metal ores and non-metallic 
minerals that are found in electrical and electronic equipment (EEE).484 Since the design of a product 
directly influences the way a value chain is managed, building circular, globally sustainable value 
chains inevitably implies a fundamental change in the practice of design.485 Recently, EU waste law 
became part of a wider policy discourse on sustainable production and consumption, moving towards 
the adoption of a circular economy. For example, as part of the Circular Economy Package, the 
European Commission proposed the addition of an obligation to ensure that, by 2030, the amount of 
municipal waste put into landfills will be reduced to 10% of the total amount of such waste.486  
The EU Commission has committed to analyze the current situation of critical raw materials in the 
context of the circular economy with a focus on material-efficient recycling of electronic waste, waste 
batteries and other relevant complex end-of-life products.487 With the transition to renewable energy 
systems set by the 2020 EU Climate and Energy Package and the 2030 EU Climate and Energy 
Framework, greater efforts are required to incorporate the Circular Economy principles into systems 
infrastructure design.  The implications of this new approach are yet to be fully be appreciated. It is 
clear, however, that existing waste regulation needs to be revised and all actors throughout the supply 
chain of products need to assume new responsibilities to change the EU’s current production system 
and close the loop, as required by the circular economy. 
4.3.2.2. EU Waste Regulation: Key Principles for Renewable Energy and Smart Energy Grids 
The EU has an extensive legal framework on waste management.488 The 1975 Framework Directive on 
Waste (FDW) lays the foundation for EU waste law. It defined key concepts, established major 
principles such as the waste hierarchy, and allocated responsibilities between different actors 
including authorities, producers, and households.489 Another important directive is the 1999 Landfill 
of Waste Directive which introduced the end-of-life cycle principle. It requires EU Member States to 
draft a national strategy for the implementation of measures aiming at developing a whole life-cycle 
approach to waste management and landfills.490 It “sets targets to progressively reduce the level of 
biodegradable waste going to landfill and bans the landfilling of certain hazardous wastes, such as 
liquid waste, clinical waste and used tyres.”491 The overall goal within the EU is to reduce the 
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percentage volume of waste being discarded in landfills. Additional Directives include the Packaging 
and Packaging Waste Directive,492 the End-of-Life-Vehicles Directive,493 and the Waste Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment Directive (WEEE).494 Each of such directives took forward the FDW waste 
hierarchy and extended responsibility principles. 
In 2008, a new Waste Directive (the 2008 Directive) developed the waste hierarchy and extended the 
applicable responsibilities, especially for producers.495 The Directive was based on Article 192(1) of 
the TFEU, which aims “to protect the environment and human health by preventing or reducing the 
adverse impacts of the generation and management of waste and by reducing overall impacts of 
resource use and improving the efficiency of such use.”496 The 2008 Directive explains the concept of 
product and material life-cycles, encourages the recovery of waste and the use of recovered materials, 
and develops end-of-waste criteria for specified waste streams.497 Under the 2008 Directive, top 
priority is given to prevention, followed by preparing for re-use, recycling, and other recovery, 
including energy recovery. Disposal is the least desirable option and is at the bottom of the hierarchy.   
Furthermore, the 2008 Directive expanded the principle of responsibility. It places responsibility for 
waste treatment upon the original waste producer. Under Article 15 of the 2008 Directive, EU Member 
States can specify the conditions of responsibility and decide in which cases the original producer is 
to retain responsibility for the whole treatment chain and in which cases the responsibility of the 
producer and the holder can be shared or delegated among the actors of the chain.498 This includes 
scenarios in which the original waste producer bears the cost of waste management.  
The trend in the EU is towards recognizing an extended producer responsibility (EPR) for new 
products, product groups, and waste streams such as electrical appliances and electronics.499 
However, the effectiveness of EPR within the EU Member States is variable. Having different national 
EPR interpretations for waste EEE hampers the effectiveness of recycling policies. For this reason, in 
2012, the Commission proposed that essential criteria needed to be decided by the EU and minimum 
standards for the treatment of waste EEE should be developed.500 
The EU is taking steps to address the impacts of renewable energy and smart grids—including the 
upscaling of solar PV,501 wind turbines, and batteries for EVs. One substantive initiative in this regard 
is the amendment of the WEEE Directive for the collection and recycle of solar PV panels. 502 
Most of the EU Member States have revised national EEE waste regulations to include solar PV in 
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national law (e.g., Spain503 and Italy504).  
The principle of producer responsibility could be extended to manufacturers for recycling wind turbine 
blades in the same way it has so effectively been done with the WEEE Directive amendment.505 If 
legislation is introduced within the wind energy industry, it is likely to be similar to the end-of-life 
vehicles legislation that introduces set recycling and recovery targets for manufacturers. This would 
require the producer to have more responsibilities. Some EU Member States have adopted measures 
to deal with the problem of wind turbine blades landfill dumping. Since 2005, Germany has banned 
all types of untreated municipal solid waste from its landfills.506 Consequently, materials with a high 
organic content (e.g., wind turbine blades) need to find different end-of-life routes. Cherrington et al. 
state that “landfill bans effectively divert waste from landfill and drive towards energy recovery.”507 
EU legislation increasingly discourages the disposal of waste in landfills, setting steeper reduction 
targets, for example the reduction of 10% by 2030 included in the Circular Economy Plan.508 Wind 
turbine manufacturers could take the initiative. Investing in solutions now will provide time to develop 
efficient systems and reduce technology costs.509 
The amendments to the WEEE Directive to increase recycling of solar PV panels and proposals to limit 
the discarding of wind turbine blades in landfills are important steps to manage the end-of-life waste 
from these renewable energy sectors.  
4.3.2.3. New Concepts and Principles to Close the Smart Grid Loop 
EPR was intended to incentivize manufacturers to increase waste management efficiencies through 
better product design. EPR’s rationale is that financial and/or physical responsibility makes producers 
internalize waste management considerations in their product strategies.510 Reports illustrate, 
however, that EPR remains a distant goal within the EU.511 A new model is needed. The EU Circular 
Economy Action Plan512 moves in that direction as it tackles one of the main obstacles to fair 
management of the life-cycle of EU products: planned obsolescence. 
The term “planned obsolescence” dates to the Great Depression, when Bernard London 
recommended the strategy as a means to foster economic recovery.513 London perceived the 
economic value of stimulating repetitive consumption. Lightbulbs were the first items to be designed 
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with planned obsolescence in mind.514 By contrast, the circular economy is based on the principle of 
planned durability, of which manufacturers have full responsibility. Improving product durability and 
reparability is important to reducing pressure on natural resources, reducing import costs for 
manufacturers, and saving money for consumers.515  
There is no legal definition of durability, but so far, the European Commission has proposed the 
following: 
Durability is the ability of a product to perform its function at the anticipated performance 
level over a given period (number of cycles/uses/hours in use), under the expected 
conditions of use and under foreseeable actions. Performing the recommended regular 
servicing, maintenance, and replacement activities as specified by the manufacturer will help 
to ensure that a product achieves its intended lifetime.516 
The practicalities of delivering planned durability are numerous and challenging.517 Manufacturers 
generally want to restrict access to spare parts and limit repair and reuse of old products.518 Key issues 
include not only the cost of spare parts but also access to information and skills development. The EU 
has produced reports exploring the potential for using regulations to stimulate durability, reparability, 
and reusability of products.519  It has also developed rules to increase design durability for some 
products, such as lighting and vacuum cleaners. Several EU Member States have introduced national 
legal measures to reduce planned obsolescence and increase reparability.520 France, for instance, 
introduced a law to address planned obsolescence. Article L. 213-4-1 of the Consumer Code now 
reads: “[p]lanned obsolescence is defined by all the techniques by which a person that places goods 
on the market seeks to deliberately reduce the lifespan of a product to increase the substitution 
rate.”521 Although limited in scope due to pressure from manufacturers lobbying during the 
negotiation of the law, judicial interpretation could provide positive developments to reduce design 
obsolescence. Another example is Norway, which requires companies to extend consumer guarantees 
on certain products, which increases the responsibility of the manufacturer.522  
To overcome excessive and unnecessary consumption, product designers need to factor in durability 
and reparability. Spare parts should be made easily available at an affordable price that incentivizes 
repair. Design models should be able to incorporate old components into newer versions of a product. 
Regarding software, making new software compatible with older models can deter consumers from 
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upgrading to new versions. The electronic equipment industry notoriously exploits incompatibility 
across new models and fosters design obsolescence. This has driven a global e-waste disposal crisis, 
especially in several developing countries such as Nigeria.523 Apple even has the battery built into its 
computers and phones. Batteries are a component that can be easily replaced, but are also a high-
level toxic waste requiring safe disposal using the best available technology.  
The Eco-design Directive is a key instrument for promoting durability.524 Already used to set binding 
minimum energy efficiency requirements, the directive is being used to develop new eco-design 
requirements for manufacturers. The directive obligates manufacturers to provide mandatory 
information on proper disposal, disassembly, and recycling at the end-of-life stage, especially for 
product groups with toxic content (e.g., mercury).525 Lifetime extension is specifically listed in the 
Directive and for certain products is “expressed through: minimum guaranteed lifetime, minimum 
time for availability of spare parts, modularity, upgradeability, reparability.”526 A different way of 
tackling the issue would be through an indirect approach, through voluntary agreements signed with 
manufacturers. Even if such agreements are not compulsory, they would imply that manufacturers 
are willing to commit to these issues. A voluntary approach is sometimes even more effective than 
legal or regulatory rules, which leads to better and longer-term results in terms of contribution to the 
circular economy.527 
The definition of durability does not refer to reparability. Design for reparability is difficult to measure 
and can lead to legal complexities if not addressed.528 Durability and reparability are two sides of the 
same coin.529 The circular economy opens opportunities for small and medium scale enterprises to 
provide reparability and recycling services. Remanufacturing and repair industries need rules that 
clarify that the repairer, or anyone putting the product into re-use, should not be considered the 
manufacturer/producer of the repaired/re-used product. Re-manufacturers will seek to avoid 
becoming a “producer” in the meaning of some EU Directives because they would be economically 
responsible for the collection and recycling of the product. They would also need to comply with the 
requirements of “new” products, such as respecting the rules on energy efficiency.530 Similarly, being 
a re-manufacturer implies being carbon-negative, which is a desired outcome.  
The complexity of smart grid systems will undoubtedly lead to demand for manufacturers and service 
providers to offer support services to consumers. It will benefit consumers, the collaborative 
economy, and the environment, as well as future generations if the legal and regulatory framework 
are in place to ensure this occurs in a circular economy where all the loops are closed. 
4.4. DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY, SMART GRIDS, AND THE LAW  
4.4.1. Background  
ICT, especially new digital applications for smart grids, plays a central role in enabling new energy 
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providers to monitor and process data, and in creating opportunities to meet the various EU energy 
policy goals, including efficiency, security, and sustainability.531 New digital technologies have made it 
possible to re-design the traditional analogue electricity power system infrastructure that has 
dominated the energy landscape in Europe since World War II. A transformation in the energy system 
will provide new opportunities not only to energy suppliers, but also to consumers.532 Through 
advanced sensing technologies, it is now feasible to provide predictive information and bespoke 
recommendations based on almost real-time data to all stakeholders (e.g. utilities, suppliers, and 
consumers). Smart grids exactly refer to this new digital networked energy infrastructure.533  
Smart grid services, which include intelligent appliance control for energy efficiency and better 
integration of distributed energy resources, can reduce carbon emissions. They offer the potential of 
higher level capabilities to meet current and future energy demands.534 Smart grids could deliver 
improved reliability, resiliency, environmentally friendly generation, transmission, and distribution. 
This would help the EU to achieve strategic economic, environmental, and social goals.535 These 
changes, which ultimately make energy systems more complex, have led to concerns regarding cyber-
attacks on critical infrastructure, energy and data theft, fraud, denial of service, hacktivism, and design 
obsolescence adding to energy poverty.536 Also, the regulation of smart grids and smart meter537 
technologies directly impacts the way data privacy is implemented in technical systems, such as smart 
meters and energy saving services.538  
An argument exists that intelligent control and adequate economic management of energy 
consumption require greater interoperability between consumers and service providers: 
“[u]nprotected energy-related data will cause invasions of privacy in the smart grid.”539 Law and 
policy-makers need to consider the trade-offs to enable smart grids to deliver low-cost and green 
energy within locally, regionally, and nationally secure networked systems. Given the dependency of 
smart grids on digital technology, their uptake is intricately interlinked with law and policy on ICT more 
generally.  
This section outlines developments in ICT law that are relevant to smart grids, both internationally 
and in the EU. The first section provides a survey of key law and policy issues related to security and 
privacy when dealing with smart grids and ICT, including an analysis of concepts such as cybersecurity, 
cyber-crime, and data management. The first section is followed by an outline of existing and 
emerging EU and international legislation addressing the above-mentioned issues and will be divided 
into privacy and data protection (4.4.3.1) and digital systems security (4.4.3.2).  
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4.4.2. Smart Grids: Cybersecurity and Privacy Issues 
Smart grids bring risks. Some risks are known, old, and foreseeable issues. Other risks are new and 
less predictable. Cybersecurity is likely to become more important in the next few years.540 Cyber-
technologies are becoming less expensive and easier to acquire, which allows states and even non-
state actors to potentially inflict considerable damage.541 Cyber-operations may not only be used for 
industrial espionage or intelligence collection, but also to delete, alter, or corrupt software and data 
resident in computers. This could entail negative repercussions on the functionality of computer-
operated physical infrastructures, including disabling power generators.542 Smart grids increasingly 
couple information in the energy sector with digital communication systems. This has created new 
vulnerabilities and resulted in smart grids becoming a security issue beyond traditional energy security 
framing and including cybersecurity.543  
Smart grids are integrated systems that include technologies, information, social and organizational 
components, policy and political requirements, and legislative and regulatory compliance.544 
Consequently, this increases the risk of compromising the ultimate objective of smart grids: reliable 
and secure power system operation. In 2008, the European Commission acknowledged that the 
electricity sector constitutes “an essential component of EU energy security.” 545 Some even argue 
that the current interdependence between the electricity and communication infrastructures is so 
profound that it could be conceived within an “energy-and-information” paradigm.546 This inter-
dependence becomes even more intricate when considering the energy systems’ critical 
infrastructure status and the potentially catastrophic impact of cyber-attacks. 
An effective regulatory framework manages both known and unknown risks, with the latter involving 
a precautionary approach. Smart grids need to ensure the security of sensitive customer information 
transmitted over an increasing number of “internet of things” (IoT) devices. Smart grids must also 
ensure that communication between stakeholders is reliable enough to deliver stable operation. 
There is a need to develop resilient formulations of risk related to holistic considerations.547 An 
integrated multilevel governance approach is required to integrate smart grids securely within society, 
although this approach presents new legal challenges for lawyers and policy-makers. 
Unlike traditional energy systems, smart grids fully integrate high-speed and two-way communication 
technologies to create dynamic and interactive infrastructure with new energy management 
capabilities.548 Smart grids energy systems are “a literal IoT”: networks with billions of interconnected 
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smart objects, such as smart meters, smart appliances, and other sensors.549 As a cyber-physical 
system, an IoT-based smart grid presents risks across different domains (i.e., generation, transmission, 
distribution, customer, service-provider, and operations markets).550 The EU acknowledges that smart 
metering systems and smart grids foreshadow this impending IoT. The EU also acknowledges that with 
this development come potentially increasing risks associated with the collection of detailed 
consumption data.551 Sander Kruese, privacy and security adviser at Alliander, a DSO in the 
Netherlands, noted that “[e]very component in the grid that has become digitized is becoming an 
attack-point.”552 Providing securitization across the entire system, a system that continuously 
incorporates new software systems and hardware from a range of providers, is a demanding task. The 
EU has adopted a strategy on cybersecurity.553 Operationalizing the goals contained in the strategy 
will be integral to addressing new potential threats posed by embedding ICT into the European Union’s 
energy system.554  
Threats that were not possible in the traditional electric grid555 are now the main concern.556 When 
combined with data from other multiple independent data sources,557 smart meter data becomes part 
of a broader and more open meta-data system.558 In different ways, all users are potential victims of 
attacks in such a context. In addition, their vulnerabilities could be drawn from previous experience 
gained in different sectors, such as IT and telecommunications.559 As an example, automated smart 
meters rely on tracking, in real time, actual power usage, and allow for two-way communication 
between utilities and end-users. Hackers targeting this technology may induce disruptions in power 
flows, create erroneous signals, block information (including meter reads), cut off communication, 
and/or cause physical damage.560  
Digital ICT has accelerated the expansion of personal data systems—making them more extensive and 
consequential in the lives of ordinary citizens.561 The costs of using personal data in today’s 
computerized record-systems are all but negligible. The result is that all sorts of personal data that 
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would otherwise be “lost” are now “harvested” by different actors that do everything from allocating 
consumer credit to preventing cyber terrorist attacks.562 New technologies allow for an 
unprecedented level of information-integration, “providing the possibility to combine new and 
existing data and technologies (interoperability) and cope with growing resources and number of 
users (scalability), through the adoption of distributed systems (cloud computing).”563   
Information gathered from energy users is integral to empowering individuals, households, and 
organizations to change their consumption patterns, increasing efficiency, and reducing energy costs 
and carbon emissions.564 In 2010, the European Commission noted that “the ICT sector should lead 
the way by reporting its own environmental performance by adopting a common measurement 
framework.”565 There is an assumed positive relationship between data access, processing, and 
dissemination to achieve beneficial behavioral change by citizens that underpins the EU policy on why 
ICT is pertinent for this purpose.  
Unlike oil, “a product that does not generate more oil (unfortunately) . . . the product of data (self-
driving cars, drones, wearables, etc.) will generate more data.”566  According to a 2012 estimate, “90% 
of the world’s data was created in the last two years alone. In fact, 2.5 quintillion bytes of data are 
created each day, which is more data than was seen by everyone since the beginning of time.”567 
However, a consequence of increased data availability, especially in the form of meta-data, is to 
narrow the realm of anonymity—so that fewer interactions, relationships, and transactions are 
possible without identifying one’s self.568 This leads to questions about privacy and security.569  
In 1890, Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren defined the individual’s need for privacy and solitude as a 
fundamental right, due to the increasing intensity and complexity of life.570 Privacy is going to be even 
further challenged in the digital era.571 Computer technologies increasingly make it possible to capture 
and use personal data in all sorts of settings and for all sorts of purposes that would once have been 
inconceivable. Leading figures amongst online corporations have argued that privacy is no longer a 
social norm or even possible: “Facebook and its CEO Mark Zuckerberg have taken the position that 
sharing of information and connectedness is the new social norm, and that privacy, on the contrary, 
is now outmoded.”572 Key questions at stake include what personal information institutions and other 
non-state actors collect, how it is collected, where it is stored, who can access it, and what actions can 
be taken on its basis.573 It can be argued that this pressure on information privacy is not the result of 
a new social norm, but the consequence of a desire for profit at the expense of eroding privacy 
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protection.574 Governments and citizens in the EU are pushing back on these incursions on privacy. 
The EU has always paid much attention to personal and domestic privacy, unlike Asian countries.575 
The perceived threat to the security of personal and family life has led to citizen resistance to smart 
meters: with their personal sphere is at stake, some react with distrust, suspicion, and hostility 
towards such new systems. 576 “Surveillance” via smart meters and IoT, therefore, results in extortion 
and fraud of the domestic sphere.577 Ensuring privacy appears to be crucial in order to address social 
barriers and support the new energy system technologies.578 The European Commission has 
recognized that, in order to achieve its broader energy and climate policy goals, building consumer 
trust in smart grids and data management must play a central role in its smart grids policy. In 2011, 
the European Commission advised that: 
[d]eveloping legal and regulatory regimes that respect consumer privacy in cooperation with 
the data protection authorities . . . and facilitating consumer access to and control over their 
energy data processed by third parties is essential for the broad acceptance of Smart Grids 
by consumers.”579 
Increasing consumer and business confidence in smart grids requires good governance and effective 
regulatory frameworks and laws.580 In the following section, the legal approaches adopted to deliver 
increased privacy and reduce cybersecurity risks from ICT and smart grids technologies are critically 
examined.  
 
4.4.3. International and EU Law 
Dependence on energy systems based on smart grids and ICT poses two major risks: one to privacy 
and data protection; the other to digital systems security. This section considers the evolving legal 
frameworks, especially within the EU, for providing a reasonable regulatory architecture to ensure the 
risks are managed effectively. 
4.4.3.1. Privacy and data protection 
Internationally, privacy is embedded in fundamental legal documents. Privacy is included as a 
normative principle in the post-war Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the legally 
binding International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).581 Developments in technology in 
the late 1960s and 1970s led both the US and Europe to recognize the need to guarantee data 
protection alongside the right to privacy. Each jurisdiction, including the various EU Member States, 
adopted differing approaches.582  
The EU has separate legislation and guidelines on data protection. They promulgate data protection 
and guidelines that are technology neutral. Explicit recognition of the legal basis for data protection is 
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contained in Article 16 TFEU.583 Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter) 
protects the fundamental right to the respect for private and family life, home, and communications 
and Article 8 provides specifically for the protection of personal data. EU data protection law has been 
decentralized in each Member State. The decentralization of this governance structure has led to 
jurisdictional tensions amongst the relevant public authorities with respect to the identification of 
both the domestic law applicable to data processing operations and the relevant enforcing national 
authority.584 Additionally, the Member States of the Council of Europe have a positive obligation to 
act in a proactive manner in order to secure the effective enjoyment of those rights protected under 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); if it could be established that a State failed to take 
appropriate measures to protect individuals under its jurisdiction from privacy violations, the State 
would be liable under the ECHR.585 
The European Commission has addressed data privacy matters and it has also specifically referred to 
smart grid technologies. The 1995 Data Protection Directive provides the foundational legal 
architecture for subsequent regulation.586 Subsequent regulation and directives added to these initial 
foundations in an ad hoc manner. The 2002 e-Privacy Directive,587 which was subsequently amended 
by Directives 2006/24/EC and 2009/136/EC, has failed to live up to the challenges of technological 
developments. The 2016 EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), however, repealed the e-
Privacy Directive. Other key legal developments included the 2008 Data Protection Framework 
Decision588 and the Regulation 45/2001.589 
The EU data protection framework establishes a number of general principles applicable to the 
process of any personal data (see Figure 4 below).590 The 2002 e-Privacy Directive constitutes a layered 
system consisting of three levels. 
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Figure 4 – Key EU Data Protection Principles 
Source - Vagelis Papakonstantinou and Dariusz Kloza, ‘Legal Protection of Personal Data in Smart 
Grid and Smart Metering Systems from the European Perspective’, in Vagelis Papakonstantinou 
and Dariusz Kloza, Smart Grid Security (Springer, 2015) 69 
 
The first level is the general level that applies to every processing of personal data. The second level, 
which extends from the first level, applies when sensitive data are being processed. The third level is 
applicable when personal data are transferred to third countries. Hence, if this happens, all three 
levels apply.591 All subsequent data protection legislation at the EU level must to comply with these 
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• Fairly and lawfully processed—Art 6(1)(a) of the 1995 Data Protection Directive 
• Data minimization 
 collected for specific, explicitly defined, and legitimate purposes—Art 6(1)(b) 
 not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes—Art 6(1)(b) 
 retained only for as long as is necessary to fulfil those purposes—Art 6(1)(c) (implicitly) 
• Data quality 
 adequate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are 
collected and/or further processed—Art 6(1)(c) 
 accurate and, where necessary, kept up-to-date—Art 6(1)(d) 
• Based on one of the legitimate bases for processing—Art 7 
 unambiguous consent of the data subject 
 performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party 
 compliance with a legal obligation of the data controller 
 protection of the vital interest of the data subject 
 performance of the task carried out in the public interest or exercise of official authority 
 legitimate interest pursued by the controller 
• Data anonymization—Art 6(1)(e) 
 kept in a form that permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary 
for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are further 
processed 
• Processed confidentially—i.e., “any person acting under the authority of the controller or of the 
processor, including the processor himself, who has access to personal data must not process them 
except on instructions from the controller, unless he is required to do so by law”—Art 16 
• Processed securely—i.e., appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect personal 
data against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration, unauthorized 
disclosure or access, in particular where the processing involves the transmission of data over a 
network, and against all other unlawful forms of processing—Art 17 
• Notified to a relevant supervisory authority—i.e., controller must notify the national 
supervisory authority before carrying out any wholly or partly automatic processing operation—





principles. Courts must also follow them when interpreting related legislation. These principles are 
incorporated into the GDPR, which will apply to all EU Member States in April 2018.592 It is important 
to consider how these new principles will be incorporated into the law and policy related to smart 
grids. 
Each principle needs to be applied according to certain conditions. Understanding the principles is 
essential to interpreting data protection laws in any given context, for example, with smart grids.593 
The following section considers the key principles in greater detail: 
Lawful processing: to understand this principle, it is necessary to refer to Article 52(1) of the Charter594 
and Article 8(2) ECHR.595 The processing of personal data is only lawful when it is done in accordance 
with the law, pursues a legitimate purpose, and is necessary in a democratic society to achieve that 
legitimate purpose. However, there is no definition of what constitutes “lawful processing” in Article 
5 of the Convention 108596 or in Article 6 of the 1995 Data Protection Directive.597 The GDPR does not 
include a definition, either. The obligations to meet the principle fall on the data gatherer and user. 
As such, it is imperative in developing regulations related to smart grids that lawmakers clearly identify 
what legitimate purposes might be for data gatherers and users. 
Data minimization: Data minimization requires that the purpose of processing data be visibly defined 
before processing is started. This requirement, although part of EU law, is left for Member States to 
interpret in domestic law. However, there will be less scope for such flexibility under the GDPR. Data 
specification requirements regulations are designed to limit the accumulation of data gathered and 
prevent the processing of data for undefined purposes. 598 This is a procedural requirement based 
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upon the principle of transparency. The use of collected data for another purpose needs an additional 
legal basis if the new processing purpose is incompatible with the original one.599 An additional legal 
basis is also necessary if data is transferred to third parties. The onus is placed on the data controller 
to comply with the obligations. The data controller must specify and make it clear to data providers 
the purpose for which data is being processed.600 There is space for flexibility only if data is used for a 
compatible purpose. Both the Convention 108 and the Data Protection Directive resort to the concept 
of compatibility: the use of data for compatible purposes is allowed on the ground of the initial legal 
basis.601 Neither law defines “compatibility,” leaving this open to interpretation when determining if 
the initial legal basis for collecting the data is valid for a purpose different than the original one for 
which it was collected. The Data Protection Directive explicitly declares that the “further processing 
of data for historical, statistical or scientific purposes shall not be considered as incompatible provided 
that Member States provide appropriate safeguards.”602 There is no requirement on the data 
controller to obtain the consent of the data subject where collected data is used for a purpose 
compatible with the original one. This flexibility gives data controllers freedom to use collected data 
further. This could result in uses that data subjects would, if they were made aware, object to. It is 
also a way to keep data beyond the time period the original data was gathered for. Despite a lack of 
reference to consumer rights in even the more recent GDPR, the European Data Protection Supervisor 
has stated that consumer protection law has a part to play in data protection, especially on the subject 
of transparency of data usage.603 
Data quality, retention, and accuracy: all processed data must be “adequate, relevant and not 
excessive in relation to the purpose for which they are collected and/or further processed.”604 The 
data controller must ensure that the purpose for gathering the data is clear, that gathering is kept to 
a minimum, and that the data collected are relevant for processing operations purposes. The data 
quality principle is aligned with the principle of limited data retention. Data should be deleted as soon 
as it is no longer needed for the purposes for which it was collected by the data controller. The 
obligation lies with the data controller to ensure that the principle of retention is met. As with the 
data minimization principle, exemptions to the principle of data retention must be established in law. 
Consumers need safeguards to ensure that their data are not used in contravention to the retention 
principle. Data controllers are obliged to ensure that the data held is as accurate as can reasonably be 
expected. This is essential for billing purposes, for example.605 
Fair processing: this principle upholds procedural transparency between data subjects and data 
controllers. Controllers must inform data subjects on whose behalf they are processing their data and 
whether the controller has any intentions to process the data for other purposes. Fair processing 
prevents secret or covert processing that may be against the wishes or interests of the data subject. 
This principle is perhaps the most significant for developing trust between the data subject and the 
data controller.606 For this principle to be effective, the terminology used to communicate with data 
subjects by data controllers must be understandable. Where data subjects have specific needs, these 
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should be taken into account by the data controller in order to meet their transparency principle 
obligations. Indeed, fair processing also means that controllers are prepared to go beyond the 
mandatory legal minimum requirements, if the legitimate interests of the data subject so require.607 
Going beyond what it is expected can be demonstrated by adopting data management standards. 
Data subjects should have free, easy access to their data. Data controllers should be able to 
demonstrate how their procedures meet data protection requirements under EU law. This emphasis 
on accountability and legitimacy is integral to building secure and trustworthy relations between data 
generators and data controllers. According to the 2013 OECD privacy guidelines, “a data controller 
should be accountable for complying with [data management] principles.”608 Also, according to the 
Article 29 Working Party’s opinion,609 the essence of accountability is the controller’s obligation to put 
in place measures that would—under normal circumstances—guarantee that data protection rules 
are adhered to in the context of processing operations, and to have documentation ready that proves 
to data subjects and to supervisory authorities what measures have been taken to comply with data 
protection rules.610 
Data Anonymization/Pseudonymization: pseudonymization is central to significantly reducing the 
risks associated with data processing, while also maintaining the data’s utility. The concept of 
pseudonymization is central to the GDPR. The GDPR defines pseudonymization as “the processing of 
personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data 
subject without the use of additional information.”611 To pseudonymize a data set, the “additional 
information” must be “kept separately and subject to technical and organizational measures to ensure 
non-attribution to an identified or identifiable person.” Any “personal data,” which is defined as 
“information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ‘data subject,’” falls within the 
scope of the Regulation. There are limits to pseudonymization: it is “not intended to preclude any 
other measures of data protection.”612 
Ongoing interpretation of principles in data protection law is important in considering their relevance 
for smart grids. All actors involved in the supply and demand of energy via smart grids need to 
understand and consider how to meet the legal obligations they face. As noted above, the failure to 
address regulators’ and customers’ privacy concerns will pose a major obstacle to successfully moving 
forward with establishing the new systems.613  
Aware of this significant problem, in 2010, the European Commission established an institution body 
to examine the multiple regulatory matters relating to smart grids: the Smart Grid Task Force (SGTF). 
The SGTF brings together eight different Commission Directors General including energy, climate, 
environment, and justice along with thirty European organizations representing all relevant 
stakeholders in the smart grids arena, from both the ICT and the energy sector.614 Given its cross-
sectoral representation, the SGTF is key to regulatory development on ICT and energy 
interconnections.  
The SGTF’s main purpose is to advise the Commission on policy and regulatory frameworks at the 
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European level and to assist in coordinating initial steps towards the implementation of smart grids 
under the provision of the Third Energy Package.615 Four expert working groups were established in 
April 2011 to explore the key challenges to smart grid deployment.616 Expert group 2 (EG2) specifically 
focuses on privacy and security issues, including developing a data protection template and an energy-
specific cybersecurity strategy, and identifying minimum security requirements. The mandate of EG2 
was to create a Smart Grid Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) template. In 2014, the EG2 
published a template for data protection impact assessment for smart grids and smart grid metering 
systems.617 The purpose of the DPIA is to provide guidance on how to perform an assessment for smart 
grid and smart metering systems. The template will help organizations to take the “necessary 
measures to reduce risks, and as such, reduce the potential impact of the risks on the data subject, 
the risk of non-compliance, legal actions and operational risk, or to take a competitive advantage by 
providing trust.”618 The DPIA is intended to help achieve holistic implementation of data protection 
principles and rules. The SGTF believes this holistic approach will safeguard confidentiality, integrity, 
and information assets for the smart grid system. Under the GDPR, it is mandatory to conduct a DPIA. 
The new regulatory landscape within the EU, dominated by the reform of data protection under the 
GDPR, is largely considered to provide more effective data protection and privacy arrangements for 
data subjects than previously. However, concerns remain, especially with the rapid development of 
technology, including the upscaling of IoT and Big Data, and it seems that legislators are perpetually 
fighting a losing battle on privacy.619 The GDPR arguably restrains this slightly but only to a relatively 
limited degree, and is arguably easily circumvented by procedural formatting over “consent” 
protocols.620 Purtova argues that “personal data will be appropriated in proportion to the de facto 
power of the data market participants to exclude others.”621 It may be that the boundaries within 
which the legal concept of privacy is interpreted are changing. Schwartz, who considers that the 
normative function of privacy lies in the formation of community and personal identity, argues that 
the individual-specific privacy focus is now challenged. Schwartz further argues that privacy should be 
a condition of social systems instead of a feature of “inborn” autonomy or a means to control personal 
data.622 The shifting nature of this debate will no doubt be evident in Court cases brought to interpret 
the EU GDPR in the coming years. What is certain, however, is that the principles for data protection 
will provide the foundations upon which the substantive law will continue to evolve. 
4.4.3.2. Digital Systems Security 
For all actors engaged in delivering a digital ICT-based energy system across Europe, security is a 
priority. The previous section considered security in data handling by data controllers of data subjects’ 
information with respect to the fundamental right to privacy. This section surveys efforts within the 
EU to address risks posed by the increasing dependence of all sectors in society on ICT. It frames this 
within the context of upscaling smart grids energy systems that see a rise in the number of service 
providers.  
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In 2013, the EU launched the Cybersecurity Strategy.623 It was understood that the goal of achieving a 
Single Digital Market would flounder if cybersecurity issues were not addressed: The strategy 
acknowledged that “for new connected technologies to take off, including e-payments, cloud 
computing or machine-to-machine communication, citizens will need trust and confidence” and that 
this would be undermined by “threats [from] different origins — including criminal, politically 
motivated, terrorist or state-sponsored attacks as well as natural disasters and unintentional 
mistakes.”624 The key initiative by the EU to secure critical digital ICT systems, such as banking, energy, 
health, and transport, is the 2016 Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS 
Directive).625 The NIS Directive strengthens and modernizes the mandate of the European Network 
and Information Security Agency that was established in 2004.626 The NIS Directive will apply to 
operators of "essential services" and to "digital service providers." EU countries have until 9 May 2018 
to transpose the Directive into national law. There will be some overlaps with the obligations under 
the GDPR, but organizations, both large and small, will face new requirements. A significant distinction 
can be made regarding the type of data protected under the NIS Directive and the GDPR. The NIS 
Directive covers any type of data breaches whereas the data protected under the GDPR is limited to 
"personal data."627 
Unlike the GDPR, which revised existing data protection law within the EU, according to the European 
Commission Vice-President for the Digital Single Market, Andrus Ansip, the NIS Directive is the first 
comprehensive piece of EU legislation on cybersecurity and a fundamental building block in that 
area.628 As a Directive, the NIS Directive requires Member States to adopt legislation to transpose it. 
This is different from the GDPR, which is a Regulation and, per its very nature, directly applies to all 
EU Member States.629 Consequently, there is space for differences in the approaches adopted by 
Member States in how to meet the NIS Directive’s requirements. This could impact its effectiveness 
in terms of securing transboundary critical energy digital ICT infrastructure, however, the NIS Directive 
does actively promote network collaboration and cooperation.630 
The NIS Directive provides guidelines for "essential service operators," for example within the energy, 
transport, banking, financial market infrastructure, health, drinking water, and digital infrastructure 
sectors, as well as "digital service providers," including entities such as online marketplaces, online 
search engines, and cloud computing service providers. National governments are to play a key 
coordinating role amongst other actors nationally and within the EU as the NIS Directive requires each 
Member State to set up a Computer Security Incident Response Team Network (CSIRT) to promote 
swift and effective operational cooperation on specific cybersecurity incidents and to share 
information about risks.631  Critical service providers who will need to cooperate with national CSIRTs 
are defined under the NIS Directive as entities who “provide a service which is essential for the 
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maintenance of critical societal and/or economic activities; that the provision of the service depends 
on network and information systems and that an incident would have a significant disruptive effect 
on the provision of that service.”632  
Operators of essential services have obligations to “take appropriate and proportionate technical and 
organizational measures to manage the risks posed to the security of network and information 
systems.”633 To achieve this, service providers are encouraged to adopt internationally accepted 
standards and specifications in order to secure networks and information systems. 634 Annex 11 of the 
NIS Directive lays out the entities considered to be “essential service operators.” Electricity is a 
subsector of the energy sector. The NIS Directive provision applies to several entities as outlined in 
Article 2 of the 2009 Electricity Directive.635 These include DSOs636 and TSOs, who are engaged in an 
“electricity undertaking,” which includes at least one of the following functions: generation, 
transmission, distribution, supply, or purchase of electricity.637 The NIS Directive clearly applies to the 
electricity sector. Providers of the service, whatever the size of the operation, need to comply with 
the NIS Directive’s requirements.  
It is important that small-scale energy providers, such as prosumers and energy cooperatives, are 
given the necessary support to adopt appropriate measures to reduce the risks to their technical and 
information networks. The focus of the observers is often on large-scale cyberattacks across national 
systems, however targeted criminal activities on relatively small-scale energy providers could inflict 
harm on customers (as well as on service providers) in many ways, from loss of power to fraud. The 
national government as well as service providers have an obligation to ensure this situation does not 
occur. One area that will require further security risk measures is the financial transactions between 
service providers and customers. This could become more challenging with the emergence of virtual 
currencies and smart contracts.638 
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5 CONCLUSION   
Many of today’s big changes are demographic: a shift in power from the West to the East, rapid 
urbanization, technology, health and well-being, and climate change and natural resources. These last 
two points are crucial to the arguments made in this article in the broader context of inclusive 
prosperity. Access to affordable and clean energy as well as climate action are two of the seventeen 
UN Sustainable Development Goals, which the international community is committed to meeting by 
2030. The Earth is our home and common inheritance. We need to make sure it is sustainably 
managed. We now have enough scientific knowledge to know that climate change is a problem. But 
the policies in place are wrong and good leadership is essential to meet the agreed targets. 
We must act now to conserve our living environment for future generations. The deployment of smart 
grids, their improved regulation, and careful consideration of their social and ethical dimensions are 
all necessary to make the transition to a low-carbon economy happen. Arguably, oil-producing 
countries may lose out in the transition to a low-carbon economy because most of their GDP comes 
from fossil fuels. But similarly, most of these countries are blessed with unique solar irradiance and, 
therefore, the potential to generate wealth out of renewable natural resources. Intermittency is 
currently one of the issues of solar and wind energy, as is safety in the case of nuclear energy. Carbon 
capture of fossil fuels will also move forward the agenda of a transition to a low-carbon economy. 
This article has shown the advantages and disadvantages of smart grids. Some of the benefits are that 
smart grids create the conditions for the proliferation of renewable energy generation. They allow for 
the self-consumption of energy. They boost energy efficiency via demand response. They alleviate 
energy poverty. They lead to decreases in fossil fuel imports. They decrease dependence on unreliable 
oil and gas suppliers and volatile prices and they promote low-carbon energy security. However, the 
transition to the new energy architecture may also generate adverse results, such as higher prices, 
abuse of market power, and an increase in overall energy consumption. 
This article has also analyzed the legal framework related to smart grids in the EU. We find that the 
EU legal framework on smart grids is fragmented and needs to be streamlined. Although sufficient 
direction for the roll-out of an “intelligent grid” exists at the regional level, there is still much legislation 
and policy that needs to be put in place, particularly at the national level. We also find that regulation 
may exist, but is not in force or is incoherent. The various components envisaged by smart grids are 
at different levels of development. Consequently, legislative responses towards more ecological 
regulation has been insufficient or lacking. Although specific legislation, and perhaps standardization, 
is desirable, the absence thereof should not operate as a hindrance to the successful deployment of 
smart grids, given that sufficient legal bases exist at the regional level, along with apparent political 
support at the national level. We also find that, in the context of smart grids in the EU, there is a need 
for stronger legislation on data protection and cybersecurity. Setting the rules, however, is not 
enough. Execution is necessary, for instance, by providing incentives to get things done. 
Finally, technological advancement is key for a successful decarbonization process. However, 
technology alone is not enough; we also need the right public policies to reach our decarbonization 
goals. Smart grids are clearly part of the EU’s future economic, social, and environmental policy 
landscape. Key strategies on the economy, the environment, and technology provide opportunities 
for the radical transformation in Europe’s energy infrastructure through smart grids to take place. It 
is also evident that the EU needs to work towards the energy transition in a manner that ensures 
balanced, equitable, fair, and just outcomes for all citizens. The collaborative economy, for example, 
should not undermine employees’ rights or environmental standards. Moreover, the concept of 
circular economy needs to be embedded in public policy, and private-sector product design and 
resource management will play a crucial role in the future. All of this will be possible with the right 
public policies in place and changes in behavior: change is difficult, even when the status quo is bad, 
but it is necessary. As a result, one may be a short-term pessimist, but a long-term optimist. 
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Moving forward, society needs to find a way to make sure that corporations see incentives for green 
growth, so that they can make a profit and protect the environment (for instance, by selling solar 
panels or electric vehicles).639 Short-termism is a great challenge for sustainable development and 
needs to be avoided at all costs. Since energy is the driver for much of what we do, clean energy is a 
sure way to reach sustainability. But the question remains: in the transition to clean energy, can clean 
energy sources be implemented on a scale that will replace fossil fuels? Ultimately, following the 
invisible-hand concept introduced by Adam Smith in the 18th century, an invisible “green” hand will 
bring sustainability to the economy. 
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